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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Jones,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Fourth Amendment is violated when police, without a warrant,
attach a Global–Positioning–System (GPS) device to a suspect’s vehicle
and use that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,2 a ruling which
∗ Marc McAllister is a 2003 graduate of Notre Dame Law School, and is the author of ten
publications. The author dedicates this article to his faithful and loving wife, Candy.
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2. More specifically, Jones ruled that the Government’s installation of a GPS tracking device
on a suspect’s vehicle, and its subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search,” id. at 949, a ruling which effectively imposes Fourth
Amendment protections upon this form of investigation.
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has significantly restrained law enforcement’s ability to utilize this
method of investigation.3 Prior to Jones, warrantless GPS tracking had
been common, and most courts were unwilling to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to this investigative technique.4 In unanimously
rejecting these decisions, the Jones ruling was surprising5 and reveals a
Court concerned by the potential for mass surveillance inherent in this
form of investigation.6 Perhaps more importantly, the Justices in Jones
employed distinct rationales, with the majority returning to a trespassbased analysis unused since the 1960’s,7 a potentially groundbreaking

3. In response to Jones, the FBI turned off about 3,000 GPS tracking devices that were in use.
See Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/fbi-turns-offthousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/.
4. Prior to Jones, most lower courts had ruled that when police use a GPS device to monitor a
vehicle’s movements in public, no “search” occurs under the principle that it is not reasonable to expect
privacy in one’s movements in public. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–
17 (9th Cir. 2010) (invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS tracking of an individual’s movements in
his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th
Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts and holding that GPS tracking is not a search); United States v. Marquez,
605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[w]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a particular vehicle is
transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a public place, they
install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time”). See also United
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“The practice of
using [GPS tracking] devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within the [Supreme]
Court’s consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which
they reveal to third parties or leave open to view by others.”).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D. Mass. 2012) (describing Jones
“as a surprise to many” in light of the lower courts’ many rulings to the contrary).
6. The potential for mass surveillance that concerned the Jones Court included the potential to
investigate the law-abiding citizen, as well as those suspected of criminal activity, on no suspicion of
wrongdoing. Several Justices voiced this concern during oral argument. For example, Chief Justice
Roberts inquired: “You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS device on all of our cars,
monitored our movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that under your theory?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf. Reacting to the same
concern, Justice Ginsburg inquired: “I think you answered the question that the government’s position
would mean that any of us could be monitored whenever we leave our homes. So, the only thing secure
is the home. Is—I mean, that is—that is the end point of your argument, that an electronic device, as
long as it’s not used inside the house, is okay.” Id. at 12.
7. To determine whether a particular form of investigation constitutes a Fourth Amendment
“search,” thereby triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections, most courts over the past forty-five
years have applied the Katz test, under which a “search” occurs when “the government[’s] [conduct]
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (“In determining
whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States.”). Rather than apply the Katz
test, the Jones majority applied the pre-Katz physical trespass doctrine; in doing so, the Court clarified
that the Katz test governs only those “search” questions that do not involve an actual physical trespass.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”).
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move in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.8
While the Jones majority’s return to a trespass-based approach leaves
many questions unanswered,9 perhaps the most important, unresolved
aspect of Jones is whether a Fourth Amendment “search” would occur
in the event the same type of monitoring could be accomplished in the
absence of a trespass10—most notably, where a suspect’s location is
determined through a GPS-enabled cell phone.11
According to all nine Justices in Jones, instances of GPS tracking that
do not require a trespass will be governed by the more traditional Katz
test,12 under which a “search” occurs when “the government[’s]
8. See United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2012)
(describing the Katz test as “the predominant approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the
1960s,” and stating that the Jones Court’s “property-based trespass analysis alters the matrix most
frequently applied in the assessment of Fourth Amendment issues because questions of ownership or the
existence of a legally cognizable property interest have not generally been considered of controlling
analytical importance [under the Katz test]”) The potential to apply Jones’s trespass approach to Fourth
Amendment “search” issues more broadly has already begun to alter Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Indeed, recent courts have employed the Jones majority’s trespass-based analysis in cases going beyond
GPS tracking, such as, for example, public camera monitoring. See, e.g., United States v. Nowka, No.
5:11-cr-00474-VEH-HGD, 2012 WL 2862139, at *4 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s
argument that a pole camera installed outside defendant’s residence and trained on this driveway was a
“search” under Jones because no trespass on Nowka’s property occurred in the installation of the pole
camera).
9. See Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (“the Jones decision left a number of issues unresolved,
among them 1) whether the government must obtain a warrant to install and use a GPS tracking device,
2) if not, what quantum of suspicion is required (e.g., probable cause, reasonable suspicion), 3) if the
Fourth Amendment is violated, whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression, and 4) if so, what
evidence must be suppressed”). See generally Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions
After United States v. Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS case”, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491 (2013)
(identifying and discussing critical questions that follow in the wake of Jones).
10. The Jones majority deemed it dispositive that “Jones . . . possessed the Jeep at the time the
Government trespassorily inserted the [GPS] device,” distinguishing him from someone who takes
possession of property upon which such a device has already been installed. United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 952. The majority distinguished Karo on these grounds because in that case, “Karo accepted
the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s
presence, even though it was used to monitor the container’s location” in much the same way as
modern-day GPS. Id. Noting the potentially broader impact of the Court’s trespass-based rationale,
some courts post-Jones have described Jones as signaling “a particular concern for government trespass
upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment] enumerates.” FigueroaCruz, 914 F.Supp.2d at 1260.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779–80 (6th Cir. 2012) (In a case where
law enforcement “pinged” a suspect’s phone to determine its location, the court distinguished Jones on
the grounds that “[n]o such physical intrusion [of the suspect’s phone] occurred in [this] case. [The
suspect] himself obtained the cell phone for the purpose of communication, and that phone included the
GPS technology used to track the phone’s whereabouts.”) (internal citations omitted).
12. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). See also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“But ‘[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass
would remain subject to Katz analysis.’”); id. at 959–61 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the Jones
majority erred in reviving the trespass test because “the Katz Court repudiated the old [trespass]
doctrine,” and suggesting that any and all “search” questions should be governed exclusively by Katz).
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[conduct] violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable.”13 While four Justices in Jones did not
specifically address the constitutionality of GPS tracking under the Katz
test, five concurring Justices did.14 Given that a majority of Justices
have already applied Katz to analyze a GPS tracking issue, and given
that the underlying rationale employed by these Justices would naturally
extend to similar forms of tracking by way of GPS-enabled cell
phones,15 the views of the concurring Justices in Jones will undoubtedly
influence these unresolved issues.16
According to those five concurring Justices,17 tracking the suspect’s
vehicle for twenty-eight days constituted a search under the Katz test.18
These Justices did not identify the precise point at which the tracking
became a search, but simply declared that “the line was surely crossed
before the 4-week mark.”19 In light of this opinion, a suspect like
Antoine Jones can claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements in public where those movements are tracked for twentyeight days or longer.20 At the other end of the spectrum, the Court’s
13. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
14. See United States v. Hanna, No. 11-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30,
2012) (“[F]ive members of the [Jones] Court concluded that [the majority’s] trespass theory did not
form a sufficiently comprehensive analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS monitoring
and argued that GPS monitoring should also (in the case of Justice Sotomayor) or only (in the case of
Justice Alito) be analyzed to determine whether it has invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
15. As argued below, despite a potential distinction between GPS tracking and cell phone
tracking, location information obtained by way of GPS-enabled cell phone enables the Government to
obtain essentially the same location information as that provided by the surreptitiously-installed GPS
device utilized in Jones, thereby implicating the same length of surveillance concerns of the Jones
concurring Justices. See infra notes 154–161 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (Eckerstrom, J.,
dissenting) (“My colleagues maintain that our result in this case is compelled by the Court’s reasoning
in [United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983),] that a person has ‘no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements’ on public roads. But, in the context we address today—the GPS tracking of a
person’s movements on public roads—five [J]ustices of the Court have implicitly declined to adopt that
part of Knotts’s reasoning. I, therefore, cannot agree that this aspect of Knotts must control our
reasoning in this case.”).
17. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which was signed by three additional Justices, described
the issue as “[w]hether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term
monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958
(Alito, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 964.
19. Id. See also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Alito concurrence that
“at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy’”).
20. At least for the particular type of suspect at issue in Jones, a suspected drug dealer. See id. at
948 (describing the suspect, Antoine Jones, as someone who the police suspected was “trafficking in
narcotics”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/5

4

McAllister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical Analy

2013]

GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING

211

prior holding in United States v. Knotts21 suggests that a person
traveling on public roads for just a few hours cannot reasonably expect
privacy in those movements,22 a decision Jones was careful not to
overrule.23 The line between these two points remains unclear.24
Complicating matters, the concurring Justices in Jones suggested that
a twenty-eight day monitoring would not constitute a search where the
investigation involved a more serious offense than that in Jones,25 and
the remaining Justices conceded that “[w]e may have to grapple with
these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory
search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis.”26
This article examines these “vexing problems”27 in depth. Since
Jones was decided in January 2012, courts in GPS tracking cases have
already begun making distinctions based upon the type of suspect and
length of surveillance.28 Through empirical studies, I set out to explore

21. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
22. In Knotts the Court upheld the warrantless use of a beeper to track a drum of chloroform
from the defendant’s point of purchase to a cabin about 100 miles away. According to the Court, the
use of the beeper did not constitute a “search” because the beeper did not provide any information police
could not have obtained through visual surveillance along the vehicle’s route. Just one year after Knotts,
the Court in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), examined a similar case and reached the
opposite result as in Knotts, primarily because the beeper in that case was used to track a can of ether
inside a private residence.
23. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (distinguishing Knotts as a case where the Court’s trespass
concerns did not apply because “[t]he beeper had been placed in the container before it came into
Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner”). See also U.S. v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914
F.Supp.2d 1250, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that Jones did not overrule Knotts, but rather
distinguished it based on “the ownership or exclusivity of the use of the chattel” at issue).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Justice Alito’s
concurrence and the majority in Jones both recognized that there is little precedent for what constitutes a
level of comprehensive tracking that would violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
25. Writing on behalf of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, Justice Alito wrote: “[R]elatively
short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy
that our society has recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964
(Alito, J., concurring). Writing separately, Justice Sotomayor appeared to ratify Justice Alito’s
suggestion when she wrote: “I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’” Id. at 955
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). With the addition of Justice Sotomayor, five Justices in
Jones appear willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon not only the length of
surveillance, but also the type of suspect at issue.
26. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
27. Perhaps these are “vexing problems” for the Court because if Justice Alito’s approach were
taken literally, the Fourth Amendment would no longer protect all American citizens equally. Rather,
the suspected criminals, the “bad guys” if you will, would enjoy fewer Fourth Amendment protections
than the purely “innocent,” law-abiding citizens would enjoy.
28. See infra notes 162–204 and accompanying text.
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whether society is likewise ready to embrace such distinctions.29
In the months following Jones, I administered two surveys designed
to test this hypothesis; each professionally designed30 and inspired by
similar instruments administered by Fourth Amendment scholar
Christopher Slobogin.31
My first survey poses a series of questions involving GPS tracking of
seven different types of suspects, including: individuals not suspected of
any crime, individuals suspected of minor crimes, and individuals
suspected of relatively severe crimes. My essential hypothesis was that
society would be willing to permit police to engage in warrantless GPS
tracking for a longer period of time when investigating the most serious
offenses.
After collecting over 230 survey responses, this hypothesis was
seemingly verified. For example, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25
of 230), would have permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to
the vehicle of an innocent suspect32 and monitor that vehicle’s
movements without first obtaining a warrant. By contrast, 67.3% of
survey respondents would have permitted a suspected terrorist’s vehicle
to be tracked with no warrant, and those individuals were generally
willing to permit a much lengthier period of surveillance for the
suspected terrorist as compared to those suspected of less severe
crimes.33 This evidence appears to validate the notion that Fourth
Amendment protections with respect to GPS tracking should vary based
upon the nature of the crime under investigation, with one of those
variations being the permissible length of warrantless surveillance.
To specifically examine the constitutionality of cell phone tracking, I
conducted a second survey posing questions relating to both GPS
29. Society’s views are arguably relevant under the Katz standard because the Katz test itself,
taken literally, anticipates examination of society’s actual expectations of privacy. See Marc McAllister,
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical Reasoning, 36 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 475, 505–08 (2012) (arguing in support of the empirical approach).
30. I designed each survey with the help of an instructional design consultant, Dr. Raoul A.
Arreola. Dr. Arreola retired from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center in 2009 with the
rank of professor emeritus. He holds a doctorate in educational psychology, specializing in research
design, measurement, and evaluation, as well as an undergraduate degree in mathematics and physical
sciences. Over the last forty-two years, he has worked primarily in the areas of instructional evaluation
and development, faculty evaluation and development, and the use of technology in the teaching and
learning process.
31. See infra notes 208–219 and accompanying text.
32. As used here, the term “innocent suspect” refers to an individual who has not previously
been convicted of a crime and who is not currently suspected of committing any crime.
33. For example, when asked whether a suspected terrorist could be tracked without a warrant,
89 of 226 survey respondents, or 39.4%, would have permitted such an individual to be tracked without
a warrant for twenty-one days or longer. By contrast, when asked whether a suspected drug dealer
could be tracked without a warrant, only 20.6% of respondents, or 46 of 223, would have permitted such
an individual to be tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.
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tracking by physical trespass upon a suspect’s vehicle, approximating
the issue in Jones; and the monitoring of a suspect’s movements by
GPS-enabled cell phone, an issue currently unresolved by the Supreme
Court.34
In this second survey, respondents were given two distinct series of
questions. In the first series of questions, respondents were asked to
assume that police had attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s
vehicle by way of trespass and had used that device to monitor the
suspect’s movements for a period of time. In the second series of
questions, identical to the first in most respects,35 respondents were
instead asked to assume that police were able to monitor an individual’s
movements by way of cell phone.
The results of this second survey, summarized in Part V, suggest
several important conclusions for the future of warrantless cell phone
tracking. First, as a general matter, society deems electronically-stored
information presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of whether that data is obtained surreptitiously by the police
or obtained directly from a cell phone provider. Second, as with the first
survey, society appears willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections
in regards to GPS tracking based upon the nature of the crime under
investigation, with length of surveillance as one of those variations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, society believed that tracking an
individual by cell phone should receive somewhat greater Fourth
Amendment protection than tracking an individual in the manner
employed in Jones. This particular finding suggests that cell phone
tracking, despite its currently limited protection, should be subject to at
least the same constraints as those imposed in Jones.36 In combination,
34. See Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“With
increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this
case by enlisting factory—or owner—installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”);
see also id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing the ability of cell phones to track a person’s
movements).
35. Emphasizing the parallel to GPS tracking, the lead-in language for the second series of
questions was as follows: “Cell phone technology, coupled with the widespread use of smart phones
among American citizens, has enabled police to determine a person’s movements with nearly as much
accuracy as a GPS device mounted on that person’s vehicle. Cell phone data, for example, is often used
to reveal where a cell phone was located at a particular point in time by identifying which cell tower
communicated with the cell phone while the phone was utilized to make a call. Cell location data makes
it possible to determine a person’s movements with precision, and can operate successfully even when
the phone is simply turned on, regardless of whether a call has been made or not. Cell phone companies
maintain accurate records of cell phone location information for all of its customers, making it possible
for police to obtain a suspect’s location information by a simple request to a cell phone provider, such as
AT&T or Verizon. Please answer the following questions related to this emerging form of police
investigation.”
36. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. With increasing regularity, the
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these findings point to a proposal, set forth in Part V, that treats all
forms of GPS and cell phone tracking alike for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment and that alters the level of suspicion required by the Fourth
Amendment based upon the length of surveillance and type of crime
under investigation.
Part II of this article summarizes the major United States Supreme
Court cases that impact the developing law of GPS tracking. Part III
highlights the two primary lines of GPS tracking cases that exist today:
those, like Jones, that involve the trespassory attachment of a GPS
device to a suspect’s vehicle; and those, numerous among the lower
courts, that address the tracking of a suspect’s movements by GPSenabled smart phone. Part IV sets forth the detailed results of each of
my surveys. Part V addresses how my survey results impact the
constitutionality of monitoring a suspect’s movements by cell phone.37
Part VI concludes.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES ON GPS AND ELECTRONIC TRACKING
A. The Law of Electronic Tracking Pre-Jones
In the years preceding Jones, police departments around the country
were utilizing GPS tracking devices to monitor the movements of
criminal suspects without warrants.38 When suspects challenged the
Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory—
or owner—installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones. In cases of electronic or
other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority
opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.”) (internal citations omitted).
37. While tracking a suspect’s movements by cell phone is the most likely method of tracking to
follow in the wake of Jones, post-Jones courts have upheld the warrantless attachment of a GPS
tracking device to a target vehicle by finding an insufficient property interest in the vehicle at issue on
the part of the particular defendant. See, e.g., U.S. v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1262–64
(N.D. Ala. 2012).
38. See, e.g., United States v. White, 484 F.3d 267, 281 (4th Cir. 2007) (detailing an extensive
federal drug investigation in Maryland involving various investigative techniques, including GPS
trackers); United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that, as part of their
investigation into robberies, police in Michigan “secretly placed a GPS tracking device on the
[defendant’s] rental car” while it was parked at an apartment complex); United States v. Santiago, 560
F.3d 62, 64–65 (1st Cir. 2009) (detailing “a year-long investigation into a large-scale heroin distribution
operation” that occurred in 2003 and 2004 in Massachusetts, in which “agents tracked [defendant’s] van
with a GPS unit and conducted visual surveillance of it; conducted court authorized wiretaps of cell
phones of the defendants; [and] tracked and observed transactions among the defendants revealed by
cell phone conversations”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that
“over a four-month period, [DEA] agents [in Oregon] repeatedly monitored Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep using
various types of mobile tracking devices,” and that agents installed the devices on seven different
occasions); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2010) (recounting how DEA and
Iowa state officers placed a GPS tracking device on the bumper of a Ford while it was parked in a
Walmart parking lot in Des Moines, Iowa, and subsequently used the device to monitor the vehicle’s
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constitutionality of that warrantless police conduct, most courts had
concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to this method of
investigation under the simple logic that no person can reasonably
expect privacy in his movements in public.39 To support that result,
courts analogized GPS tracking to one of two Supreme Court cases from
the 1980’s, each involving the tracking of a vehicle by electronic beeper.
In United States v. Knotts,40 the Court upheld the warrantless use of a
beeper to track a drum of chloroform from the defendant’s point of
purchase to a cabin about 100 miles away.41 According to Knotts, the
use of the beeper did not constitute a “search” because the beeper did
not provide any information police could not have obtained through
visual surveillance along the vehicle’s route.42
Just one year after Knotts, the Court in United States v. Karo43
examined a similar case and reached the opposite result, primarily
because the beeper in that case was used to track a can of ether inside a
private residence.44 Distinguishing the public surveillance in Knotts, the
Court reasoned that “indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
movements back and forth to Colorado); United States v. Smith, 387 Fed. App’x. 918, 919 (11th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (describing an investigation in Florida in which police installed a GPS device on the
truck of a person suspected of trafficking marijuana); United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272,
272–73 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing an investigation in which Arizona police attached a GPS tracking
device to the suspect’s Jeep which was programmed to send text message updates of the Jeep’s location
every four minutes, then tracked the Jeep’s movements into several states, eventually leading to the
suspect’s arrest in Illinois).
39. See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216–17 (invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS
tracking of an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search); United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts and holding that GPS tracking is
not a search); Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (“[w]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a particular
vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a public
place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time”). See also
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“The practice of using [GPS
tracking] devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within the [Supreme] Court’s
consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which they reveal
to third parties or leave open to view by others.”).
40. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
41. Having suspected Knotts of manufacturing drugs, federal officers, without a warrant, had
installed a beeper in a chemical drum they knew would be sold to Knotts. With the beeper’s assistance,
officers followed Knotts’s vehicle to where it stopped outside a certain cabin. Based on this
information, the police secured a warrant to search the cabin, and uncovered incriminating evidence
inside. Id. at 278–79.
42. According to the Knotts Court, “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,”
and the “use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the vehicle] . . . does not alter the situation.” Id. at
281–282.
43. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
44. Because the beeper in Karo was used to monitor the can’s movements within a private
residence, see id. at 714, the Court described the issue as follows, “whether the monitoring of a beeper
in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights
of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.” Id. at 714.
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withdrawn from public view” must remain subject to Fourth
Amendment oversight.45
Invoking Knotts and distinguishing Karo, pre-Jones GPS tracking
cases typically concluded that when a GPS tracking device is used to
monitor a suspect’s movements on public roads, no “search” occurs
because the suspect cannot reasonably expect privacy in those
movements.46 Applying the Knotts/Karo distinction, most courts
analyzing the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking prior to
Jones reasoned that tracking a vehicle’s movements in public is more
akin to “non-search” forms of surveillance, such as an officer physically
trailing a suspicious vehicle.47 However, some pre-Jones courts refused
to apply this rationale, on the grounds that it fails to account for inherent
differences between tracking a vehicle for a few hours by beeper and
tracking that same vehicle for a substantially longer period of time by
the more sophisticated GPS.48 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Jones to resolve the split.49
B. United States v. Jones
In Jones, the United States Supreme Court unanimously struck down
one instance of GPS tracking in which a suspect’s vehicle was

45. As the Court explained, “[Karo] is thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper told the
authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts’ cabin. . . . [H]ere, [by contrast] the monitoring indicated
that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified [by the police from
outside the house],” id. at 715, and one that “the Government is extremely interested in knowing.” Id.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (invoking Knotts
and holding that the GPS tracking of an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged period
is not a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Marquez,
605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating in dicta that “when police have reasonable suspicion that a
particular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a
public place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time”).
47. In one such case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit viewed GPS
tracking as more akin to hypothetical practices it assumed are not searches, such as tracking a car “by
means of cameras mounted on lampposts or satellite imaging.” See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d
994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f police follow a car around, or observe its route by means of cameras
mounted on lampposts or of satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search.”).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
use of a GPS tracking device to monitor an individual’s movements over a four-week period is a search,
and rejecting the Government’s argument, based on an attempted extension of Knotts, that “[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another” even in such extended instances of GPS tracking); People v.
Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440–44 (2009) (distinguishing Knotts, and declaring: “At first blush, it would
appear that Knotts does not bode well for Mr. Weaver, for in his case, as in Knotts, the surveillance
technology was utilized for the purpose of tracking the progress of a vehicle over . . . predominantly
public roads and, as in Knotts, these movements were at least in theory exposed to ‘anyone who wanted
to look.’ This, however, is where the similarity ends.”).
49. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
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monitored on public streets for twenty-eight days.50
In Jones, without a valid warrant,51 officers installed a GPS tracking
device on suspect Antoine Jones’s jeep while it was parked in a public
parking lot.52 Over the next twenty-eight days, officers used the device
to track the movements of Jones’s vehicle.53 The resulting GPS data
connected Jones to a structure that contained large amounts of cash and
cocaine, evidence that was used to bring criminal charges against
Jones.54
Before trial, Jones unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence
obtained through the GPS tracking device.55 Following most prior GPS
tracking decisions,56 the trial court reasoned that, just as in Knotts, “‘[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.’”57
On appeal, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion (consisting of
Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor58)
considered “whether the attachment of a Global–Positioning–System
(GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets,
constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”59
In its phrasing of the issue, the Jones majority limited its analysis to
the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,”60 rather than
50. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant).
See also id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan that the lengthy GPS monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth Amendment
“search,” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the majority that “a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum,
‘where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally
protected area’”).
51. Although the officers had obtained a warrant authorizing installation of the device, the device
was installed after the warrant had expired and outside the jurisdiction specified in the warrant. Id. at
948.
52. Id.
53. Id. The device relayed more than 2,000 pages of data regarding the vehicle’s movements
over the four week period. Id.
54. Id. at 949.
55. The District Court granted the motion in part, suppressing only the data obtained while the
vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d
71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006).
56. See supra note 4.
57. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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within private spaces,61 potentially triggering the rationale underlying
Knotts that one cannot reasonably expect privacy in his movements in
public. Effectively rejecting the principle underlying Knotts, the
majority held that a “search” had occurred;62 since no warrant justified
the search, the evidentiary fruits of that search had to be suppressed.63
While all nine Justices in Jones agreed that this particular instance of
GPS tracking triggered the protections of the Fourth Amendment,64 the
Justices were split in their rationale. Instead of applying the Katz test,
the majority applied the pre-Katz physical trespass doctrine.65 Under
this test, the majority reasoned that “a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term
is used in the [Fourth] Amendment;”66 and in this case, the Government
physically trespassed upon Jones’s vehicle by attaching the device as it
was parked in public.67 According to the majority, “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that
61. In limiting the issue to the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,” the Jones
majority seemingly accepted the District Court’s suppression of the GPS tracking data obtained while
the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. See id. at 948.
62. According to the majority, “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” Id. at 949.
In its brief in Jones, the Government argued that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information that is knowingly exposed to public view, and that Antoine Jones himself had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle on public streets because that
information was exposed to public view. See Reply Brief for the United States at 18, 38, United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5094951. Invoking Knotts, the Government
argued that “[t]his case, like Knotts, involves movements of a vehicle on public streets,” which is
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 22. In ruling for Jones, the majority effectively rejected
the Government’s Knotts-based argument.
63. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (affirming the lower court’s judgment that admission of the
evidence obtained by use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment, and refusing to address the
Government’s argument that the warrantless “search” that occurred in this case was made reasonable,
despite no valid warrant, by the reasonable suspicion or probable cause the officers had obtained before
using the device).
64. See id. at 949 (holding that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a [Fourth
Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant). See also id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan that the lengthy GPS
monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” thereby presumptively
requiring a warrant); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘where, as here, the Government
obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area’”).
65. See id. at 949–52. According to the majority, Katz did not repudiate the understanding that
the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it
enumerates. See id. at 950. Rather, “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 947. Thus, as the majority saw it,
“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” Id. at 950. However,
as the majority clarified, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at 953.
66. Id. at 949.
67. According to the majority, “[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a
protected area.” Id. at 952.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/5

12

McAllister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical Analy

2013]

GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING

219

device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search,’”68
and a presumptively unreasonable one in the absence of a valid
warrant.69
Criticizing the majority’s trespass-based analysis, Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
instead employed the Katz test.70
Emphasizing the length of
surveillance as the most important factor, the concurring Justices
declared that the majority’s trespass-based analysis “largely disregards
what is really important (the use of a GPS for long-term tracking) and
instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as
relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object
that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation).”71
According to these four Justices, “the lengthy monitoring that occurred
in this case [twenty-eight days] constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment,”72 further noting that “the line [of Fourth Amendment
protection] was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”73
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to voice her agreement with both
the majority and the Alito concurrence.74 According to Justice
Sotomayor, the majority’s trespass-based analysis was sufficient to
resolve the case75 because “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ property
for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading
privacy interests long afforded . . . Fourth Amendment protection.”76
Despite agreeing with the majority, Justice Sotomayor went on to
declare that “the Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with
trespassory intrusions on property;”77 rather, even in the absence of a
trespass, “‘a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.’”78 Employing this test, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the
other four concurring Justices that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS
68. Id. at 949. In a similar passage, the majority declared: “The Government physically
occupied private property [i.e., Jones’s vehicle] for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id.
69. See id. at 954.
70. Emphasizing the length of surveillance as the critical factor, Justice Alito’s concurrence
described the issue as “[w]hether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 961.
72. Id. at 964.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 955.
76. Id. at 954.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 954–55.
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monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations
of privacy.’”79
As the dust of Jones settles, we know that there are currently two
ways in which a particular instance of GPS tracking may constitute a
Fourth Amendment “search.”80 First, as the Jones holding makes clear,
a “search” occurs when the Government trespassorily81 installs a GPS
tracking device upon a suspect’s “effect” and uses that device to monitor
the vehicle’s movements, even where those movements are monitored
only on public streets.82 When such a trespassory attachment has taken
place, a “search” will always have occurred, regardless of the length of
surveillance.83
Alternatively, when the government installs a GPS tracking device on
or within a piece of property at a time when the particular suspect at
issue has no legal interest in the property, the installation of the device is
not a “trespass” and is therefore not a “search” for purposes of the
trespassory test.84 This result applies as well when a suspect takes
possession of an item that contains a factory-installed GPS device, as in
the case of most modern cell phone purchases.85 In the event of no

79. Id. at 955.
80. See United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 2012) (“An individual may
challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if it violates the individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy,’ or involves an unreasonable ‘physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.’”) (citing
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–53 (2012)); United States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539,
546 (W.D. La. 2012) (“Jones established, or perhaps reiterated, that there are two ways to analyze
[whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred]: a traditional common-law property rights test
and the Katz/reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.”). See also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1414 (2013) (utilizing the same two-part “search” framework set forth in Jones).
81. In other words, at a time when the defendant has a legal interest in the property. See Jones,
132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (refusing to consider Jones’s status in relation to the vehicle at issue because the
Government acknowledged, and did not challenge, that Jones was “the exclusive driver”).
82. See id. at 949 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”); id. at
952 (“By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area”). See also Free
Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 677 F.3d 519, 542–43 (3d Cir. 2012).
83. In such instances, Jones creates a bright-line rule, one that does not depend upon factors that
would be relevant under a traditional Katz analysis. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring)
(“If the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow the car for even a brief time,
under the Court’s theory, the Fourth Amendment applies.”).
84. The Jones majority deemed it dispositive that “Jones . . . possessed the Jeep at the time the
Government trespassorily inserted the [GPS] device,” distinguishing him from someone who takes
possession of property upon which such a device has already been installed. Id. at 952. The majority
distinguished Karo on these grounds because in that case, “Karo accepted the container as it came to
him, beeper and all, and therefore was not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was
used to monitor the container’s location” in much the same way as modern-day GPS. Id.
85. Here again, the same reasoning would apply because when a person purchases a GPSenabled cell phone, that person has likewise “accepted the [phone] as it [comes] to him, [GPS] and all,
and therefore [i]s not entitled to object to the [GPS device’s] presence, even [if] it [i]s used to monitor
the [phone]’s location.” Id.
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trespass, a Fourth Amendment “search” could only occur if the Katz test
is satisfied.86 To satisfy the Katz test, the person invoking Fourth
Amendment protection must demonstrate a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action, an
analysis which is necessarily fact specific.87 Under Katz, factors such as
the length of surveillance, the nature of the suspected crime, and the
location of the vehicle become critical, but as a totality of circumstances
inquiry,88 other factors may be important as well.89
III. LOWER COURT GPS TRACKING CASES POST-JONES
A. GPS Tracking Accomplished by Way of Trespass
Consistent with the explicit holding of Jones, post-Jones courts have
held that when law enforcement officers attach a GPS tracking device to
a suspect’s vehicle and use that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs (without regard to the
types of factors that might be relevant under a Katz-based analysis, such
as length of surveillance).90
United States v. Lee91 is illustrative. In Lee, DEA agents received a
tip that defendant Robert Dale Lee had at one time obtained marijuana
86. Id. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”).
87. Free Speech Coalition, Inc., 677 F.3d 542–43.
88. In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has consistently voiced a preference
for a case-by-case approach. In 1931, the Court declared: “There is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” Go-Bart Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). The Court in Sibron v. New York similarly declared, “[t]he
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be
decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case.” 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968). And, just
recently, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones declared, “[t]he best that we can do in this case is to
apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular
case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” See United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
89. As one court put it, when a defendant takes possession of a piece of property on which a GPS
device has already been installed, the continued monitoring of the device would not be a “search” of that
particular defendant under the trespassory test, but may constitute a “search” of the defendant under the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. That analysis, however, would depend on the specific facts
of the case. United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028 (D. Minn. 2012).
Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a very short monitoring of a suspect’s location on public streets), with United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in location in a private
residence).
90. See e.g., Kelly v. State, 56 A.3d 523, 538 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“In the case before us,
there was a physical trespass, and therefore, placement of the GPS device [on the defendant’s vehicle]
constituted a search, without need to address [defendant’s] reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether the facts in this case, distinguishable from the facts in Jones, would pass muster.”).
91. United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
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from Chicago and transported it to eastern Kentucky in his car.92
Several months later, Lee, who had been in prison on similar charges,
reported to the United States Probation Office in London, Kentucky, for
the last day of his supervised release.93 While Lee met with his
probation officer, DEA Task Force Officer Brian Metzger secretly
installed a GPS tracking device on Lee’s car.94 The tracking device,
which had not been authorized by a judge, transmitted the location of
Lee’s vehicle to DEA agents in real time.95
Three days after installing the device, DEA agents noticed that Lee
had driven to Chicago.96 The next day, the agents observed Lee’s
vehicle moving back towards Kentucky.97 Suspecting that Lee had
again driven to Chicago to obtain marijuana, Officer Metzger contacted
Kentucky State Trooper Matt Hutti, told him that the vehicle “probably”
contained marijuana, and told him that he “would have to obtain his own
PC, probable cause, for a traffic stop.”98 When Lee reached the area
where Hutti was stationed to intercept him, Hutti observed that Lee was
not wearing a seatbelt as he drove past.99 Consequently, Hutti pulled
Lee over for the seatbelt violation.100 Soon thereafter, two drug-sniffing
dogs alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics within the car. Officers
then searched the car and found approximately 150 pounds of
marijuana.101
Lee later moved to suppress the marijuana found in his vehicle.102 On
March 22, 2012, about two months after Jones was decided, Magistrate
Judge Ingram recommended granting the motion to suppress.103 Judge
Amul R. Thapar of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky agreed.104 According to Judge Thapar, “[u]nder
even the narrowest reading of Jones, ‘when the government physically

92. Id. at 562.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 562.
99. Id. at 563.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Given the rather clear Jones holding, both Lee and the United States agreed that the DEA
agents performed an illegal search when they installed a GPS device on Lee’s car without Lee’s
knowledge or consent. Id. at 564. The parties therefore centered their arguments on possible exceptions
to the exclusionary rule, including the good-faith exception and the attenuation doctrine. See id. at 564–
71 (analyzing the issues).
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invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.’”105
Applying this rule, Judge Thapar found “no[] dispute that [Officer
Metzger] physically invaded Lee’s property when he placed the GPS
tracker on Lee’s car.”106 According to Judge Thapar, “[t]hat physical
invasion was a trespass, and that trespass continued while the device
transmitted information to the DEA agents.”107 Under a simple
application of Jones, Judge Thapar thus concluded “that the DEA agents
performed an illegal search when they installed a GPS tracking device
on Lee’s car without a warrant.”108
While post-Jones courts have consistently held that a “search” occurs
when law enforcement officers attach a GPS tracking device to a
suspect’s vehicle and use that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements (pursuant to the explicit holding of Jones), most of these
courts have ultimately refused to suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of that tracking by employing one of the exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. For example, in United States v. Ford,109 a federal
District Court ruled that “law enforcement must obtain a warrant to
place a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle,” and held that “[h]ere, [the
investigating officer] did not obtain a warrant and he therefore violated
Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”110 Despite that ruling, the
Ford court upheld the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result
of this Fourth Amendment violation under the exclusionary rule’s goodfaith exception outlined in Davis v. United States,111 which creates an
exception to exclusion “when the police act with an ‘objectively
reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful.”112
Application of the Davis good-faith exception is a common theme
among the post-Jones GPS tracking cases, effectively preventing
suppression in those cases where warrantless, trespassory GPS tracking
was conducted prior to Jones and in reasonable reliance upon existing
case law at the time.113
105. Id. at 570–71.
106. Id. at 571.
107. Id.
108. Id. Moreover, Judge Thapar noted that “[e]ven though the DEA agents could have
determined Lee’s location through cell phone data under [the jurisdiction’s case precedent], they could
not obtain that same information through an illegally placed GPS device under Jones.” Id. at 571.
109. United States v. Ford, No. 1:11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2012).
110. Id. at *8.
111. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). Despite the lack of binding circuit court
precedent at the time of the officer’s action, the Ford court concluded that the officer’s reliance on nonbinding precedent from “three out of four federal circuits to hear the GPS tracking device issue” prior to
Jones was reasonable. Ford, 2012 WL 5366049, at *11.
112. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22–24 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting no
dispute “that the installation of and use of GPS tracking devices, post-Jones, constitutes a ‘search’ under
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B. GPS Tracking Accomplished Without Trespass: Cell Phone Tracking
Law enforcement is often able to duplicate the type of tracking that
occurred in Jones by monitoring the location of a suspect’s cell phone.
Given that no trespass is required to monitor the location of a suspect’s
cell phone, this method of investigation is currently subject to fewer
constitutional constraints. As a result, police agencies are utilizing this
form of tracking more frequently. Indeed, the number of requests to cell
carriers for location information has grown “exponentially” over the
past several years, with major wireless carriers now receiving thousands
of requests each month.114
Cell phone tracking by law enforcement comes in two primary forms.
In the most precise form of tracking, cell phone providers are able to
monitor a cell phone’s location, and subsequently transmit that
information to law enforcement anytime a user activates the GPS on
such a phone.115 This method of tracking is used by law enforcement
thousands of times each year and is becoming more common.116
United States v. Jones117 illustrates how this form of cell phone
tracking may be used. In Jones, agents obtained a search warrant
authorizing them to receive “pings” with the location of a suspect’s cell
phone for a thirty-day period.118
Thereafter, Sprint provided
information to an officer via e-mails sent directly to the officer’s
phone.119 The e-mails contained longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates
and a link to a map indicating the phone’s exact location, accurate to

the Fourth Amendment,” but ultimately ruling that the government’s failure to get a warrant to authorize
its use of GPS tracking devices does not require suppression of evidence due to the Davis good-faith
exception); Kelly v. State, 56 A.3d 523, 538–41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (holding that the installation
and use of GPS tracking device on defendant’s vehicle involved a physical “trespass,” thus constituting
a Fourth Amendment “search;” but that evidence obtained from the GPS device was admissible under
the good-faith exception); United States v. Hardrick, 2012 WL 4883666, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2012)
(refusing to decide the constitutionality of acquiring cell-site location information because the goodfaith exception applied and was dispositive of the defendant’s motion to suppress). See also Kelly, 56
A.3d at 540–41 (summarizing similar cases).
114. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 117, 121 (2012) (citing Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2010,
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/18/the-snitch-in-your-pocket.html).
115. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
116. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone
Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 491 (2012). According to Rothstein, all cell
phones sold since 2003 are GPS-enabled, making most phones today at least potentially trackable.
However, a user can disable her phone’s GPS. Moreover, whether a phone transmits GPS data may
depend on the network and on the phone’s applications. Id. at 493.
117. 2012 WL 2568200 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2012).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *1 n.2.
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within just a few meters.120 Using this data, officers were able to
determine the suspect’s location, initiate a traffic stop, and eventually
discover large amounts of illegal narcotics in the suspect’s vehicle.121
As this case exemplifies, pinging a cell phone in this manner allows law
enforcement to remotely obtain the precise location of a suspect’s cell
phone in real time, information that may later lead to the discovery of
incriminating evidence.122
In another, similar form of cell phone tracking, police are able to
obtain cell phone location data by identifying which cell tower
communicated with the cell phone while the phone was either turned on
or utilized to make a call.123 Using this technique, a suspect’s location
can often be determined through methods of triangulation from various
cell towers,124 although the precision of cell site data may depend on the
distance between cell towers in the user’s vicinity,125 especially where
triangulation is not employed.126 Cell phone companies maintain
records of this information127—usually when a phone sends and receives
text messages and at the beginning and end of each call128—making it
possible for law enforcement to request either “real time” cell site
information or “historical” cell site information.129 With historical cell
120. Id. Ultimately, this investigative technique was declared constitutional because it had been
authorized by a valid warrant. See id. at *4.
121. See id. at *2.
122. See also United States v. Orbegoso, 2013 WL 161194 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2013) (describing an
investigation where law enforcement employed both surreptitiously installed GPS tracking devices and
cell phone tracking).
123. United States v. Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010). Moreover, as
Justice Alito notes in Jones, “phone-location-tracking services are offered as ‘social’ tools, allowing
consumers to find (or to avoid) others who enroll in these services.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
124. United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008). See
also In re Applications of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D. Mass. 2007) (“[C]ell site
information coupled with a basic knowledge of trigonometry makes it possible to identify with
reasonable certainty the location from which a call was made.”).
125. See United States v. Hardrick, 2012 WL 4883666, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 2012) (noting that
“the more cell-site tower locations in a given area, the more precise the location information can be for a
user’s particular call” and that “densely populated regions are equipped with more cell-site towers”).
126. As one court has noted, cell towers can be up to ten or more miles apart in rural areas and
may be up to a half-mile or more apart even in urban areas. See In re Application of the United States,
405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
127. See In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“If a
user’s cell phone has communicated with a particular cell-site, this strongly suggests that the user has
physically been within the particular cell-site’s geographical range. By technical and practical
necessity, cell-phone service providers keep historical records of which cell-sites each of their users’
cell phones have communicated. The implication of these facts is that cellular service providers have
records of the geographic location of almost every American at almost every time of day and night.”).
128. Rothstein, supra note 116, at 494.
129. See In re Application of the United States, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437 (“As a cell phone user
moves from place to place, the cell phone automatically switches to the tower that provides the best
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site information, law enforcement may request all such data
accumulated over a period of time in the past; by contrast, with real-time
data, law enforcement may seek to obtain this information on a real-time
basis into the future.130 The tracking of a cell phone in this manner does
not require the installation of any device, hence no trespass; rather, the
phone itself does the work.131
As technology evolves, cell site location information is becoming just
as accurate, and in some instances even more so, than alternative forms
of GPS tracking, a development that supports my proposal to treat all
forms of electronic monitoring alike for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. This evolution has two primary causes. First, due to the
massive increase in the use of data by cell phone users in recent years
(AT&T, for example, experienced an 8,000 percent increase in data
traffic from 2007 to 2010),132 carriers have been forced to deploy new
cell sites and reduce the coverage area of existing cell towers, which, in
turn, makes cell site data more accurate.133 Second, new technologies—
including microcell, picocell, and femtocell technology134—have the
potential to make cell site location information more accurate than GPS.
Because these technologies often broadcast a signal no farther than a
subscriber’s home, single cell site location data can in some cases be
more accurate than GPS.135 For example, in urban areas where
microcell technology is used, a cell phone’s location can be identified on
an individual floor or room within a building.136
In striking down the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device in
Jones, the majority based its decision on the physical trespass that was
required to monitor the vehicle’s movements.137 Jones did not address
the constitutionality of obtaining similar tracking information in the
absence of a trespass, including location information obtained directly

reception,” which in turn enables the Government to obtain “cell-site information concerning the
physical location of the antenna towers associated with the beginning and termination of calls to and
from a particular cellphone.”). See also id. at 447 (noting the distinction between requests for
“historical versus real time data”).
130. See United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2012).
131. In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 81 n.11.
132. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 132.
133. Id. at 132–33.
134. For a description of this technology, see id. at 132.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 137.
137. According to the majority, “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951. Crucial to the majority’s analysis is the fact that
“Jones . . . possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the [GPS] device.” Id.
at 952.
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from a suspect’s cell phone provider.138 According to Jones, the
constitutionality of non-trespassory forms of GPS tracking, like cell
phone tracking, would be governed by Katz.
Under the Katz framework, obtaining tracking information directly
from a third-party provider is arguably not a “search” under the
Supreme Court’s assumption of risk rationale, which posits that one
cannot reasonably expect privacy in certain types of “addressing
information” knowingly disclosed to a third party,139 such as a telephone
company.140 Indeed, many courts have likened this form of evidence to
company business records, which are generally unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment.141 If this rationale is applied to instances of cell
phone tracking, this method of investigation would fall outside the
Fourth Amendment’s protections altogether, regardless of the volume of
data requested or the length of surveillance.
United States v. Graham,142 decided just a few weeks after Jones,
illustrates the potential application of the assumption of risk rationale to
the warrantless gathering of historical cell site location information
(CSLI). In Graham, a federal District Court ruled that the government
does not need probable cause or a warrant to obtain more than seven
months of CSLI from a cell phone provider.143 In that case, two
defendants were thought to have conducted a series of armed robberies,
and a key piece of evidence linking them to each robbery was data about
the movements of their cell phones.144 The defendants sought to
138. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 442
(2009) (“[W]ith GPS becoming an increasingly routine feature in cars and cell phones, it will be
possible to tell from the technology with ever increasing precision who we are and are not with, when
we are and are not with them, and what we do and do not carry on our persons—to mention just a few of
the highly feasible empirical configurations.”).
139. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979) (distinguishing the content of
communications, which are protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the addressing information
associated with those communications, which are not, and reasoning: “[t]elephone users . . . typically
know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has
facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information
for a variety of legitimate business purposes. . . . [I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscribers,
under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain
secret.”).
140. The government advanced this argument in United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384
(D. Md. 2012), a case decided less than two months after Jones. See id. at 388.
141. See, e.g., id. at 398 (“Like the bank records at issue in Miller [which are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment], the historical cell site location records in this case are not the ‘private papers’ of
the Defendants—instead, they are the ‘business records’ of the cellular providers . . . and are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 394–95.
144. On March 25, 2011, the government applied for an order from a magistrate judge pursuant to
the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, “which ordered Sprint/Nextel, Inc. to
disclose to the government ‘the identification and address of cellular towers (cell site locations) related
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suppress this evidence because the government did not obtain a warrant
authorizing its acquisition.145 Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the
court ruled that the defendants “[lacked] a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the historical cell site location records acquired by the
government.”146 According to the court, “[l]ike the dialed telephone
numbers in Smith, the [d]efendants in this case voluntarily transmitted
signals to cellular towers in order for their calls to be connected,”147 and
“[t]he cellular provider then created internal records of that data for its
own business purposes.”148
In reaching this result, the Graham court described Jones as “relevant
but not controlling in this case.”149 The court distinguished Jones on the
grounds that historical cell site location data exposes only historical
evidence of a suspect’s past locations,150 whereas GPS technology
reveals the location and movements of a suspect in real time and is “far
more precise than the historical cell site location data at issue here.”151
Like Graham, a majority of courts to have considered the
constitutionality of acquiring historical cell site location information
have invoked Smith’s assumption of risk rationale, effectively
eliminating Fourth Amendment protection, regardless of the volume of

to the use of the [Defendants’ cellular telephones].” Id. at 386. The government sought cell site
location data for the periods of August 10–15, 2010; September 18–20, 2010; January 21–23, 2011; and
February 4–5, 2011. Id. In its application, the government alleged that the information sought was
relevant to an ongoing investigation of robberies the defendants were suspected of committing. Id. “By
identifying the location of cellular towers accessed by the defendants’ phones during the relevant time
periods, the government sought to more conclusively link the defendants with the prior robberies.” Id.
The magistrate judge issued the order under the reasonable suspicion standard utilized by the Stored
Communications Act. Id. In a second order, the Government sought cell site location data for the
periods July 1, 2010 through February 6, 2011. This order was granted by a separate magistrate judge
under the same reasonable suspicion standard. Id. The government’s request resulted in the release of
almost 22,000 individual cell site location data points. Id. at 387.
145. Id. The Graham defendants did not argue that the Stored Communications Act is
unconstitutional on its face, but instead argued that the length of time and extent of the cellular phone
monitoring conducted in their particular case intruded on their expectation of privacy and was therefore
unconstitutional. Id.
146. Id. at 389.
147. Id.
148. Id. See also id. at 399 (“Like the bank records at issue in Miller, [and] the telephone numbers
dialed in Smith . . . , historical cell site location records are records created and kept by third parties that
are voluntarily conveyed to those third parties by their customers. As part of the ordinary course of
business, cellular phone companies collect information that identifies the cellular towers through which
a person’s calls are routed.”).
149. Id. at 406 n.2.
150. While this may be a plausible distinction of Jones, the distinction would not apply in those
instances in which the government seeks “real time” cell site information. See In re Application of the
United States, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting the distinction between requests for
“historical versus real time data”).
151. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
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information obtained.152 However, not all courts have chosen to follow
Graham’s approach, especially for larger volumes of data acquired over
lengthier periods of time.153
Given the concurring Justices’ opinions in Jones, this complex issue
should not be resolved by such a simple application of the assumption of
risk doctrine, especially when one considers the inability of that doctrine
to account for the realities of the digital age.154 Cell site location
information enables the Government to obtain nearly the same type and
volume of location information provided by the surreptitiously-installed
GPS device utilized in Jones, especially if a suspect is a frequent phone
user, thereby implicating the very concerns of the five Justices who
concurred in Jones regarding the aggregation of various bits of private
information.155 According to Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, “GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”156 all highly
private and intimate matters.157 Moreover, the longer that an individual
is tracked by GPS, the more data that can be accumulated, naturally
152. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, No. 1:10CR221, 2011 WL 1595255, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
27, 2011); United States v. Velasquez, No. CR 08-0730 WHA, 2010 WL 4286276, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
22, 2010); United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26,
2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8–11
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); In re Applications of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80–81 (D. Mass.
2007).
153. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118–19 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (“Here, the Government has requested . . . at least 113 days of constant surveillance of an
individual. . . . [T]he application seeks information that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. . . . The
cell-site-location records sought here captures enough of the user’s location information for a long
enough time period—significantly longer than the four weeks in Maynard—to depict a sufficiently
detailed and intimate picture of his movements to trigger the same constitutional concerns as the GPS
data in Maynard.”).
154. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(agreeing with Justice Alito that long-term GPS monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy” with
or without a physical intrusion, and noting that individuals often have no choice but to reveal private
information to third parties (e.g., calls and texts to and from cell phones, internet browsing history) and
yet still would be offended by government monitoring of the very same data). See also McAllister,
supra note 29, at 520–21 (2012).
155. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing her concern that, “[w]ith
increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this
case by enlisting . . . GPS-enabled smartphones”). Perhaps the primary factor noted by the concurring
Justices in Jones was the length of surveillance. See id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) (“the Court’s
reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor
(attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s
operation)”). See also In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 118–19.
156. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
157. See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing “GPS monitoring” as “making available at a
relatively low cost . . . a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
Government . . . chooses to track”).
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leading to a greater invasion of privacy.158 These concerns apply to both
GPS tracking in the manner employed in Jones and GPS tracking
accomplished via cell phone. In her Jones opinion, Justice Sotomayor
further reasoned, “[a]wareness that the Government may be watching
chills associational and expressive freedoms.”159 Again, this is true of
both GPS tracking in the manner employed in Jones and GPS tracking
accomplished via cell phone—perhaps even more so with respect to cell
phone tracking given the inherently tighter connection between a
person’s phone and her First Amendment rights. Finally, in neither case
does the suspect know his location is being tracked by government
agents.160 With very little difference between the types of information
provided by both forms of investigation, and very little difference in the
manner in which the information is conveyed to police, acquisition of
this type of information should be more carefully analyzed by taking
into account the opinions of the Jones concurring Justices.161
In cases that have rejected or failed to employ the assumption of risk
doctrine, leading to a more precise Katz-based analysis, courts have
begun to draw lines based upon the factors noted by Justice Alito—most
notably, the length of surveillance. Employing Katz, several post-Jones
courts have ruled that tracking a suspect for only a few days, whether
through cell phone tracking or through more traditional forms of GPS
tracking, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search.”
For example, in United States v. Skinner,162 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined whether the tracking of a cell
phone for three days constituted a “search” under Katz. In that case,
DEA agents discovered a large-scale drug-trafficking operation after
arresting one of its participants, Christopher Shearer, who then divulged
information about the scheme.163 According to Shearer, the operation’s
marijuana supplier, Philip Apodaca, used couriers to send marijuana
from his home in Arizona to another participant, James Michael West,
in Tennessee.164 The defendant, Melvin Skinner, was one of those
couriers. Agents also learned from Shearer that Apodaca purchased
158. According to Justice Sotomayor, “[t]he Government can store such records and efficiently
mine them for information years into the future.” Id. at 955.
159. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
160. Rothstein, supra note 116, at 495 (2012) (noting that judicial orders authorizing cell phone
tracking are usually accompanied by a gag order preventing the service provider from notifying
consumers that the government is accessing their location information, and that associated records are
usually placed under indefinite seal).
161. See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. As the Jones majority noted, the
inside/outside distinction between Knotts and Karo is also potentially relevant here. See supra notes
59–63 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
163. Id. at 775.
164. Id.
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pay-as-you-go cell phones that he programmed with contact information
and then gave to the couriers to maintain communication. Apodaca was
unaware that these phones were equipped with GPS technology.165
In late June 2006, agents learned that Skinner would meet Apodaca in
Arizona on July 11 to pick up approximately 900 pounds of marijuana
for transport to Tennessee on July 13.166 In the meantime, agents
obtained an order from a magistrate judge on July 12 authorizing the
phone company to release subscriber information, cell site information,
GPS real-time location, and “ping” data for the cell phone thought to be
used by Skinner. That same day, agents “pinged” this particular cell
phone and discovered that it was then located near West’s primary
residence.167 Agents subsequently determined that West, rather than
Skinner, was using this particular phone.
Agents then obtained a second judicial order authorizing release of
the same information for the phone actually being used by Skinner,
which revealed that the phone was located near Flagstaff, Arizona.168
By continuously “pinging” the second phone, authorities learned that
Skinner left Arizona on July 14 and was traveling across Texas. At no
point did agents follow the vehicle or conduct any type of visual
surveillance.169
At around 2:00 a.m. on July 16, the GPS indicated that Skinner’s
phone had stopped near Abilene, Texas. DEA agents in that area were
then dispatched to a nearby truck stop, where they discovered Skinner’s
vehicle. After a dog sniff alerted to the presence of narcotics, officers
searched the vehicle and discovered over 1,100 pounds of marijuana.170
Prior to trial, Skinner sought to suppress the evidence obtained from
his vehicle, arguing that the agents’ use of GPS location information
emitted from his cell phone was a warrantless search that violated the
Fourth Amendment.171 The trial court, however, denied his motion.172
In affirming that decision, the Sixth Circuit analogized the case to
Knotts and distinguished it from Jones.

165. Id. After some time, the drug conspirators would discard their pay-as-you-go phones and get
new ones with different telephone numbers and fictitious names. Id.
166. Id. at 775–76.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Skinner was subsequently charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute in excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and
841(b)(1)(A), conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and aiding
and abetting the attempt to distribute in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 777 (describing the lower court proceedings).
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According to the Skinner court, as in Knotts, Skinner was traveling on
public roads throughout his journey.173 As such, “[w]hile the cell site
information aided the police in determining Skinner’s location, that
same information could have been obtained through visual surveillance”
along Skinner’s public route.174
In distinguishing Jones, the Skinner court first reasoned that, unlike in
Jones where police physically intruded upon a constitutionally-protected
area by attaching the GPS tracking device to Jones’s vehicle, “[n]o such
physical intrusion occurred in [this] case.”175
Rather,
“Skinner[’s] . . . phone included the GPS technology used to track the
phone’s whereabouts,” thereby rendering the Jones majority’s trespass
concerns inapplicable.176
Responding to Justice Alito’s concerns regarding the comprehensive
tracking of a suspect’s movements, the Skinner court further declared
that “[n]o such extreme comprehensive tracking is present . . . [where]
the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s cell phone for three days.”177
According to the court, such “relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”178 This is
because, as the court declared, “the monitoring of the . . . vehicle as it
crossed the country is no more of a comprehensively invasive search
than if instead the car was identified in Arizona and then tracked
visually, and the search handed off from one local authority to another
as the vehicles progressed,”179 thereby eliminating any expectation of
privacy Skinner may have had in his location.180
In State v. Estrella,181 a case similar to Jones, in that agents
trespassorily attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona deemed any trespass-based argument from
Jones to have been waived and therefore analyzed the issue under

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 779–80.
176. Id. at 780. Later, invoking the Jones Court’s discussion of Karo, the Skinner court reasoned,
“the Government never had physical contact with Skinner’s cell phone; he obtained it, GPS technology
and all, and could not object to its presence.” Id. at 781.
177. Id. at 780.
178. Id. (citations omitted).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 781. The court declared that no Fourth Amendment violation would have occurred
even if the agents had not obtained court orders authorizing the GPS tracking of Skinner’s cell phone.
See id. at 779 (“Although not necessary to find that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this
case, the Government’s argument is strengthened by the fact that the authorities sought court orders to
obtain information on Skinner’s location from the GPS capabilities of his cell phone.”).
181. State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
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Katz.182 In Estrella, DEA agents, acting without a warrant, placed a
GPS tracking device on a van after discovering that the van was being
used to transport illegal drugs.183 Similar to Jones, agents attached the
device while the van was parked in a public parking lot.184 Also similar
to Jones, agents then used the device to monitor the van’s
movements.185
After the GPS device indicated the van was traveling in a direction
that corresponded with allegations of illegal drug distribution, agents
then contacted Arizona state police and informed them that the van
might be transporting marijuana.186 In response, Arizona police located
the van and pulled it over.187 Upon discovering that the driver,
defendant Estrella, had an outstanding arrest warrant, agents arrested
Estrella and searched the van, which yielded bundles of marijuana.188
Estrella later moved to suppress the marijuana, alleging that the
warrantless placement and use of the GPS device violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.189 The trial court, however, denied the motion.190
On appeal,191 the court found Estrella to have waived any argument
under the trespass theory espoused in Jones192 and instead addressed
whether Estrella could assert a successful Katz claim.193
In rejecting Estrella’s claim, the court presented two, intertwined
rationales.194 Most importantly, the court declared that, “generally ‘[a]
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,’”195 and that “[t]his is true particularly where the government’s
monitoring is short-term.”196 Given the limited use of the GPS device,
182. Id. at 152–53.
183. Id. at 151.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 151–52.
190. Estrella was later convicted. Id. at 152.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 152–53.
193. Id. at 153.
194. The first rationale was based on the defendant’s lack of standing. According to the court,
“Estrella provided no evidence he had permission to drive the van or otherwise had any interest in it
when the device was attached to the vehicle in a public parking lot,” presumably defeating his claim to
an expectation of privacy in that vehicle. Id. at 154.
195. Id. at 153 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
196. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (shortterm monitoring of person’s movements in public “accords with expectations of privacy that our society
has recognized as reasonable”)). According to the court, this is particularly true where “the driver has
borrowed another’s vehicle without any knowledge of whether it is being tracked by a GPS device”
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the court refused to address “the hypothetical situation Justice
Sotomayor’s observation suggests, in which GPS tracking is used to
aggregate large amounts of personal data for a much longer period of
time, or on a purely arbitrary basis.”197
In a similar case, United States v. Luna-Santillanes,198 where agents
installed multiple GPS tracking devices on vehicles driven by three
suspects,199 the court rejected Jones’s trespass approach and held that a
one-day track of a suspect’s vehicle was not a “search” under Katz. In
the relevant portion of the opinion, the court analyzed whether a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when police attached a GPS tracking
device to a red Lincoln Aviator and used that device to monitor the
Aviator’s movements for one day.200 According to the court, the two
defendants who objected to this monitoring, neither of whom were
present at the time the Aviator was searched, did not have standing to
object to that action,201 making Jones’s trespass rationale
inapplicable.202
Next, and more significantly, the court applied the Katz test and
concluded that “even if Defendants could establish that they had
standing to challenge the . . . search and seizure of the red Lincoln
Aviator, the one-day monitoring of that vehicle” was not a Fourth

because “[f]rom the reasonable borrower’s perspective, it is entirely possible the owner has permitted
the installation of such a device.” Id. at 153–54.
197. Id. at 154. According to the court, “[t]he determination of whether that type of surveillance
may intrude on a person’s reasonable expectations of privacy, and accordingly run afoul of
constitutional standards, must wait until the issue is presented.” Id.
198. United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26,
2012).
199. See id. at *2–3 (describing the warrantless attachment and subsequent monitoring of GPS
tracking devices to three vehicles being driven by defendants, a red Lincoln Aviator, a silver Chrysler
Sebring, and a black Mazda).
200. According to the facts as described by the Luna-Santillanes court, DEA agents installed a
GPS device on the red Lincoln Aviator on April 13, 2011. See id. at *2. On April 14, 2011, DEA
agents used the GPS device on the Aviator to monitor its movements, through which agents were able to
determine that the Aviator had traveled to Chicago and was on its way back to the Detroit area. At that
point, DEA agents requested assistance by the Michigan State Police to conduct a traffic stop of the
Aviator. Id. Once the vehicle was stopped, the driver and sole occupant consented to a search of the
vehicle, which produced two kilograms of heroin. Id. After this search, the GPS tracking device was
removed within hours, id. at *7, such that the GPS device was on the Aviator “for two days at the most.”
Id. at *7 n.4.
201. Id. at *6. According to the court, unlike the defendant in Jones, neither defendant at issue
could establish that they were the “exclusive driver” of the vehicle, and the vehicle was not registered to
either defendant. Id.
202. See id. at *6 (reasoning that, due to the lack of standing in the vehicle at issue, “unlike the
defendant in Jones, D-1 and D-2 cannot persuasively argue that ‘[t]he Government usurped [their]
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on [them], thereby invading privacy interests long
afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.’”) (quoting United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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Amendment violation.203 With little discussion of this issue, the court
simply reasoned that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that
our society has recognized as reasonable.”204
As Skinner, Estrella, and Luna-Santillanes make clear, tracking a
suspect’s vehicle by GPS for only a few days likely does not constitute a
“search” under a Katz-based analysis. Thus, while the opinions of the
five concurring Justices in Jones indicate that a suspect similar to
Antoine Jones can reasonably expect privacy in his movements in public
where those movements are tracked for twenty-eight days or longer,
these more recent decisions indicate that a person traveling on public
roads over a few days cannot reasonably expect privacy in those
movements. Exactly where the line of protection begins between these
two points remains unclear.
IV. SURVEY RESULTS
As recent GPS tracking cases illustrate, tracking a suspect by GPS for
only a few days likely does not constitute a “search” under the Katz test,
an approach that seemingly complies with Justice Alito’s opinion in
Jones. However, tracking a suspect for a lengthier period of time likely
does constitute a “search” under the Katz test. As Justice Alito noted in
Jones, however, the result in such cases might depend on the actual
crime under investigation.205 In the months following Jones, I
administered two surveys designed to test Justice Alito’s suggestion. I
designed each survey with the help of an instructional design consultant,
who ensured the validity of each survey instrument.206 This section sets
forth the detailed results of each of these surveys.
A. Overall Survey Design
A court analyzing a “search” issue under Katz must consider whether
“society is prepared to recognize [a defendant’s asserted expectation of
privacy] as reasonable.”207 Taken literally, the Katz inquiry anticipates
at least some assessment of society’s actual expectations of privacy, as

203. United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
26, 2012).
204. Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
205. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
206. See supra note 30.
207. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
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opposed to an analysis that entirely disregards society’s views.208
According to Fourth Amendment scholar Christopher Slobogin, there
are at least two ways to determine societal attitudes about privacy. The
first is to examine property, contract, and tort doctrine for clues as to
what society believes is private.209 For example, in the context of GPS
tracking, the California legislature has made it unlawful for private
citizens to “use an electronic tracking device to determine the location
or movement of a person” and has specifically declared that “electronic
tracking of a person’s location without that person’s knowledge violates
that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”210
A second method is to simply pose the question to society.211 This
form of empirical analysis is gaining acceptance among legal scholars,
particularly under the Fourth Amendment, where scholars have
employed the empirical approach to analyze various Fourth Amendment
“search” issues.212 My surveys follow in the footsteps of similar
surveys conducted by Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher.
In 1993, Slobogin and Schumacher conducted a survey, completed by
217 individuals, which included fifty scenarios involving various forms
of police investigation.213 Several years later, Slobogin conducted a
second survey, completed by 190 people, which contained twenty police
investigation scenarios.214
In each of these studies, the subjects were asked to rate each
investigative method in terms of “intrusiveness” on a scale of 1 to 100,
with 1 representing “not intrusive” and 100 representing “very

208. Scholars agree. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 33 (University of Chicago Press 2007)
(arguing that “some assessment of societal attitudes about the relative intrusiveness of police actions
should inform the analysis” under Katz and noting that “the Court has pretty much ignored this precept,
with predictably anomalous results”); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1000
(2007) (“I part with the High Court . . . on its refusal to determine those expectations [of privacy] in any
rational manner. Rather than grapple with the complications of surveys or other evidence, the Court has
been content to declare societal expectations without any foundation or support. . . . Either courts
should look to academic empirical studies like those done by Professor Slobogin (in which case we need
more like them), or litigants should prepare relevant surveys” of their own.).
209. SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 33.
210. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7. Other states have enacted similar legislation. See, e.g., UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5; MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.37, 626A.35; FLA. STAT.
§ 934.42; S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-140; OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 80342, 803-44.7; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761.
211. SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 33.
212. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 112, 184 (tables reporting empirical data).
213. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
214. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 208, at 110–11 (describing survey design).
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intrusive.”215 Slobogin and Schumacher hypothesized that “many of the
Court’s conclusions about expectations of privacy and autonomy do not
correlate with actual understandings of innocent members of society.”216
As Slobogin and Schumacher demonstrated, judicial conclusions about
expectations of privacy do not always correlate with actual expectations
of privacy among society.217
My surveys are similar to the Slobogin and Schumacher surveys but
contain key differences.218 Most significantly, unlike the Slobogin and
Schumacher surveys, in which survey participants were instructed to
numerically assess the extent to which they considered each method “an
invasion of privacy or autonomy,”219 my surveys simply ask
respondents to indicate whether they believe police should have to
obtain a search warrant before undertaking each type of activity
identified by the survey instrument. Thus, my survey employs a simple
“yes” or “no” option, rather than a 100-point scale of invasiveness.220
This binary method more closely follows the analysis required by Katz,
which effectively requires a reviewing court to determine whether
society does, or does not, expect privacy in the particular case at hand.
B. GPS Tracking Survey
My first survey focuses exclusively on GPS tracking of the type that
occurred in Jones—i.e., where officers surreptitiously attach a GPS
tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle and subsequently use that device
to monitor the vehicle’s movements for a period of time. This survey
poses a series of questions involving GPS tracking of seven different
types of suspects, including: individuals not suspected of any crime,
215. Id. at 111. See also Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 213, at 735–36. According to
Slobogin and Schumacher, “[w]ith respect to searches, we wanted to discover [society’s] expectations of
privacy in the searched area.” Id. at 733. To uncover those expectations, Slobogin and Schumacher
sought evidence regarding “how society perceives the ‘intrusiveness’ of government investigative
methods.” Id. According to the researchers, “[u]sing the single word ‘intrusiveness’ is less
cumbersome than speaking about the impact of government conduct on reasonable expectations of
privacy . . . . At the same time, ‘intrusiveness’ captures the core of the construct we sought to
investigate . . . .” Id.
216. Id. at 733–34.
217. See id.
218. Among other differences, my survey examines particular “search” issues not examined by
Slobogin and Schumacher. For example, my survey includes questions relating to police access of
computer files and records, including the issues presented in United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500
(9th Cir. 2007), ones not included in Slobogin’s surveys.
219. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 213, at 735–36.
220. Note, however, that the GPS tracking questions contain three overall options as to whether
GPS tracking should be allowed in the absence of a warrant: (1) “Yes, indefinitely,” (2) “No,” and (3)
“Yes, but only for a limited time.” If a respondent selects choice (3), she is then presented with an
additional question asking her to specify the acceptable length of warrantless tracking.
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individuals suspected of minor crimes, and individuals suspected of
relatively more severe crimes.
This survey considered the following suspects: (1) a person who has
not been convicted of a previous crime and who is currently not
suspected of committing any crime (i.e., an “innocent suspect”); (2) a
person who has not been convicted of a previous crime but who is
currently suspected of having committed an unspecified crime; (3) a
person who is a convicted felon, but who is not currently suspected of
committing another crime; (4) a person who is a convicted felon, and
who is currently suspected of committing another, unspecified crime; (5)
a suspected terrorist; (6) a suspected drug dealer; and (7) a suspected
serial killer.
Tracking Justice Alito’s suggestion in Jones, which highlights the
type of crime under investigation and the length of surveillance as
potential factors under Katz, my first hypothesis was that society would
generally believe that Fourth Amendment protections should vary based
upon the nature of the crime under investigation. Examining the other
factor noted by Justice Alito, I further hypothesized that most people
would be willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon the
length of surveillance. Combining the two, my basic hypothesis was
that society would agree that Fourth Amendment protections should
vary based upon the nature of the crime under investigation, and most
people would permit police to engage in warrantless GPS tracking for a
longer period of time when investigating the most serious offenses.
1. Variations Based on the Type of Suspect
After collecting over 230 survey responses, I was able to verify my
first hypothesis. For example, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 of
230), would have permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to the
vehicle of an innocent suspect221 and monitor that vehicle’s movements
without first obtaining a warrant. By contrast, when asked whether
police should be permitted to monitor a suspected drug dealer’s222
vehicle by way of surreptitiously installed GPS, nearly half of all survey
respondents, 47.1%, would have permitted this individual to be tracked
without a warrant.223 Finally, when asked the same question regarding
the tracking of a suspected terrorist, 67.3% of survey respondents would
221. As used here, the term “innocent suspect” refers to an individual who has not previously
been convicted of a crime and who is not currently suspected of committing any crime.
222. Among the seven different types of suspects hypothesized by my survey, the suspected drug
dealer represents the type of suspect that most closely approximates the suspect in Jones.
223. On this question, 20.6% of survey respondents would have permitted warrantless GPS
tracking to extend twenty-one days or longer.
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have permitted warrantless tracking.224
These trends were observed across all seven different types of
suspects identified in this survey. Examining the seven suspect types,
three distinct groups of suspects emerge. Group One includes innocent
suspects who are not suspected of committing any crime, which
encompasses Suspect Types 1 and 3. Group Two includes individuals
who are either suspected of committing a minor crime or whose
suspected crime was left unspecified, including Suspect Types 2, 4, and
6. Group Three includes suspects who are suspected of committing a
severe crime, Suspect Types 5 and 7.
Group One includes the suspects who were presumed to be innocent.
For Suspect Type 1, the innocent suspect not suspected of committing a
crime, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 of 230), would have
permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to the vehicle of this
particular suspect and monitor that vehicle’s movements without first
obtaining a warrant. Similarly, for Suspect Type 3, the convicted felon
who is not currently suspected of committing a crime, only 26.3% of
survey respondents (60 of 228), would have permitted police to attach a
GPS tracking device to this particular suspect’s vehicle and monitor that
vehicle’s movements without first obtaining a warrant. Given these
small percentages, society appears generally unwilling to permit
warrantless GPS tracking of an innocent suspect.
By contrast, when we examine the results of the Group Three
suspects, those suspected of committing a severe crime, society’s views
appear to flip. For Suspect Type 5, the suspected terrorist, 67.3% of
survey respondents (152 of 226) would have permitted this individual to
be tracked without a warrant.225 Likewise, for Suspect Type 7, the
suspected serial killer, 64.8% of survey respondents (142 of 219) would
have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant.
The Group Two suspects are in the middle, and they include those
individuals who are either suspected of committing a minor crime or
whose suspected crime was left unspecified: Suspect Types 2, 4, and 6.
For Suspect Type 2, a person who has not been convicted of a
previous crime but who is currently suspected of having committed an
unspecified crime, only 45.6% of survey respondents (103 of 226)
would have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant,
whereas 54.4% of respondents (123 of 226) would have required a

224. Of those respondents who would have permitted the tracking of a suspected terrorist in the
absence of a warrant, 89 of 226 respondents, or 39.4%, would have permitted such an individual to be
tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.
225. Among the entire cohort, almost 40% of respondents (90 of 226), would have permitted the
suspected terrorist to be tracked without a warrant for a relatively lengthy period of time—i.e., twentyone days or longer.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

33

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

240

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

search warrant authorizing such tracking.
For Suspect Type 4, a person who is a convicted felon and currently
suspected of committing an unspecified crime, 68.0% of survey
respondents (153 of 225) would have permitted this individual to be
tracked without a warrant, whereas only 32.0% of respondents (72 of
225) would have required a search warrant to do so.
Finally, for Suspect Type 6, a suspected drug dealer, 47.1% of survey
respondents (105 of 223) would have permitted this individual to be
tracked without a warrant, whereas 52.9% (118 of 223) believed police
should have to obtain a warrant. Notably, for the suspected drug dealer,
only about 1 in 5 respondents would have permitted warrantless GPS
tracking to extend twenty-one days or longer, a result which lends strong
empirical support for the Court’s holding in Jones, where the Court
unanimously invalidated the tracking of a suspected drug dealer for
twenty-eight days without a valid warrant.226
2. Variations on the Permissible Length of Surveillance
Regarding the permissible length of warrantless GPS tracking, the
results of the first survey appeared to verify my second hypothesis that
society would be willing to allow warrantless GPS tracking for a longer
period of time when investigating the most serious offenses.
Beginning with the Group One suspects, society appeared unwilling
to permit warrantless GPS tracking of an innocent suspect for any period
of time. For Suspect Type 1, the innocent suspect not suspected of
committing a crime, only 10.9% of survey respondents (25 of 230),
would have permitted police to attach a GPS tracking device to the
vehicle of this particular suspect and monitor that vehicle’s movements
without first obtaining a warrant. Of those 25 individuals, 22 of them
would have permitted warrantless GPS tracking for only a few days.227
Across all 230 respondents, only three would have permitted this
individual to be tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer.
226. Here, only 46 of the 223 respondents, or 20.6%, would permit warrantless GPS tracking to
extend twenty-one days or longer. Given that only 1 in 5 respondents would permit warrantless GPS
tracking to extend twenty-one days or longer for a suspect similar to Antoine Jones, the Government’s
analogy to visual observation of a vehicle in public, as argued in Jones, a case involving a twenty-eight
day warrantless GPS tracking, simply fails to adequately resolve the issue. In its Jones brief, the United
States argued that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information knowingly
exposed to public view, which directly applied to Jones. See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 18, 38,
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5094951.
227. Four of these 22 survey respondents selected “less than 1 day” as the length of time police
would be permitted to track this individual without a warrant; 3 selected one day, 1 selected two days; 9
selected 3–5 days; 5 selected 6–10 days; and no respondents selected 11–20 days. Accordingly, of these
22 respondents, 8 would have permitted such warrantless tracking for only two days or less; and 9
would have allowed such tracking to extend 3–5 days without a warrant.
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Similar results appear for Suspect Type 3, the convicted felon who is
not currently suspected of committing a crime. Here, only 26.3% of
survey respondents (60 of 228), would have permitted police to attach a
GPS tracking device to the vehicle of this particular suspect and monitor
that vehicle’s movements without a warrant. Of the 60 respondents who
would permit warrantless tracking, 10 selected either “less than 1 day”
or “1 day” as the permissible length of surveillance; eight selected “3–5
days”; nine selected “6–10 days”; and 32 would have permitted
warrantless tracking for twenty-one days or longer.228
Although society seems willing to permit a convicted felon (who is
not currently suspected of committing a crime) to be tracked for a
lengthier period of time than the innocent suspect, the overriding
sentiment is that police should never be permitted to attach a GPS
tracking device to the vehicle of an innocent suspect and monitor that
vehicle’s movements in the absence of a warrant.
By contrast, when we examine the results of the Group Three
suspects, those suspected of committing a severe crime, society appears
generally willing to permit warrantless GPS tracking. For Suspect Type
5, the suspected terrorist, 67.3% of survey respondents (152 of 226)
would have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant,
whereas only 32.7% of respondents (74 of 226) would have required a
warrant to do so. Among the entire cohort, almost 40% of respondents
(90 of 226), would have permitted the suspected terrorist to be tracked
without a warrant for a relatively lengthy period of time—i.e., twentyone days or longer. Nearly half of all respondents (107 of 226) would
have permitted the suspected terrorist to be tracked without a warrant for
eleven days or longer, and a majority of all respondents (124 of 226)
would have permitted the suspected terrorist to be tracked without a
warrant for six days or longer.
Similar results appear for Suspect Type 7, the suspected serial killer.
For the suspected serial killer, 64.8% of survey respondents (142 of 219)
would have permitted this individual to be tracked without a warrant,
whereas only 35.2% of respondents (77 of 219) would have required a
search warrant to do so. Among the entire cohort, almost 40% of all
respondents (86 of 219), would have permitted the suspected serial killer
to be tracked without a warrant for twenty-one days or longer, and
almost 50% of respondents (109 of 219) would have permitted the
suspected serial killer to be tracked without a warrant for six days or
longer.
As a whole, these results suggest that society is willing to permit law
enforcement to track by GPS those suspected of the most extreme
228. The remaining respondent selected “11–20 days” as the permissible length of surveillance.
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crimes for at least several days without prior judicial approval. When
compared to the innocent suspects, society seemingly agrees that police
should have greater freedom to investigate the most serious offenses by
way of GPS.
C. Cell Phone Tracking Survey
To further refine my research, I conducted a second survey posing a
similar set of questions relating to both GPS tracking by way of physical
trespass, approximating the issue in Jones; and GPS tracking
accomplished in the absence of a physical trespass by way of a GPSenabled smart phone, an issue that currently remains unresolved. This
second survey sought to determine whether society meaningfully
distinguishes between these two methods of tracking. To determine
whether a trespass upon an effect should, or should not, be dispositive,
this survey seeks to determine whether society expects the same, more,
or less privacy in the tracking of cell phones, which are presumably
known to contain GPS devices upon purchase, vis-à-vis tracking by way
of GPS device surreptitiously attached to a suspect’s vehicle.
In this second survey, respondents were given two series of questions.
In the first series of questions, respondents were asked to assume that
police had attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle by way
of trespass and had used that device to monitor the suspect’s movements
for a period of time (as in Jones). In the second series of questions,
identical to the first in most respects,229 respondents were instead asked
to assume that police were able to monitor an individual’s movements
by obtaining location information directly from the suspect’s cell phone
provider.
This second survey had only two basic questions. First, the survey
asked whether police should be required to obtain a search warrant
before they may attach a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle and
subsequently monitor that vehicle’s movements. Second, the survey
asked whether police should be required to obtain a search warrant in
229. Emphasizing the parallel to GPS tracking, the lead-in language for the second series of
questions was as follows: “Cell phone technology, coupled with the widespread use of smart phones
among American citizens, has enabled police to determine a person’s movements with nearly as much
accuracy as a GPS device mounted on that person’s vehicle. Cell phone data, for example, is often used
to reveal where a cell phone was located at a particular point in time by identifying which cell tower
communicated with the cell phone while the phone was utilized to make a call. Cell location data makes
it possible to determine a person’s movements with precision, and can operate successfully even when
the phone is simply turned on, regardless of whether a call has been made or not. Cell phone companies
maintain accurate records of cell phone location information for all of its customers, making it possible
for police to obtain a suspect’s location information by a simple request to a cell phone provider, such as
AT&T or Verizon. Please answer the following questions related to this emerging form of police
investigation.”
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order to acquire a suspect’s cell phone location information directly
from a cell phone provider. Each of these questions contained three
initial answer choices: (1) “Yes, the police should have to get a warrant
regardless of the nature of the crime being investigated;” (2) “No, the
police shouldn’t have to get a warrant to do this;” and (3) “It depends on
the nature of the crime the police are investigating.”
For those respondents who picked answer choices (1) or (2), no
additional questions were asked. However, respondents who selected
answer choice (3) were then asked to specify permissible lengths of
surveillance for the following different types of suspects: (i) a person
who has not been convicted of a crime and who is not suspected of
committing any crime; (ii) a person who is not suspected of a crime and
who has not been accused of committing any crime; (iii) a convicted
felon who is not suspected of committing any crime; (iv) a convicted
felon who is suspected of committing a crime; (v) a person suspected of
planning or engaging in terrorist acts; (vi) a suspected drug dealer
involved in a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving large amounts of
cash and narcotics; (vii) a suspected serial killer; (viii) an individual
suspected of using illegal drugs; (ix) a suspected car thief; (x) an
individual suspected of illegally growing marijuana; and (xi) an
individual suspected of engaging in a series of bank robberies.
1. Survey Results
The results of this survey are significant. Most notably, society saw
no statistically significant difference in tracking an individual by means
of a GPS tracking device attached to that person’s vehicle and tracking
that same individual by a GPS-enabled cell phone. Generally speaking,
the majority of respondents deemed location information data
presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
whether that data is obtained by way of surreptitiously installed GPS or
directly from a cell phone provider. Moreover, while the results for
each method of tracking were similar, society believed that tracking an
individual by a GPS-enabled cell phone should receive somewhat
greater Fourth Amendment protection than tracking an individual in the
manner employed in Jones.
The following chart summarizes these results:
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have to get a warrant
regardless of the nature
of the crime being
investigated
No, the police
shouldn’t have to get a
warrant to do this
It depends on the nature
of the crime the police
are investigating

[VOL. 82

GPS Tracking: Should
police be required to
obtain a search warrant
before they may attach a
GPS device to a
suspect’s vehicle?

Cell Phone Tracking:
Should police be
required to obtain a
search warrant in order
to obtain a suspect’s cell
phone location
information directly
from a cell phone
provider?

51.7%
(92 of 178)

58.4%
(101 of 173)

9.0%
(16 of 178)

9.8%
(17 of 173)

39.3%
(70 of 178)

31.8%
(55 of 173)

As with my initial survey, the results of this second survey further
support the notion that Fourth Amendment protections in regards to GPS
tracking should vary depending on the nature of the crime being
investigated.
While less than a majority, nearly 40% of all respondents indicated
that the nature of the particular crime police are investigating should
alter whether police should be required to obtain a warrant before they
may attach a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle. Nearly 32% of all
respondents selected the same option with respect to obtaining a
suspect’s cell phone location information directly from a cell phone
provider. Respondents who selected this particular answer choice were
then given additional questions in which they were asked to specify
permissible lengths of surveillance for different types of suspects.
Digging deeper into the data, of the 70 respondents who believed the
constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking should depend on the
nature of the crime police are investigating, only six would have allowed
the movements of an innocent suspect (Suspect Type (i)) to be
monitored without a warrant, whereas 61 would have required a warrant
in this situation.230 By contrast, for the suspected terrorist (Suspect
Type (v)), 64 respondents believed police should not be required to
230. Three of these 70 respondents did not answer the follow-up questions.
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obtain a warrant to monitor this suspect’s movements by surreptitiouslyinstalled GPS, whereas only three indicated that police should have to
obtain a search warrant to do so. When these distinct types of suspects
are compared, this data tends to support the argument that Fourth
Amendment protections in regards to GPS tracking should indeed vary
depending on the nature of the crime being investigated.
When the other suspect types are examined (again, isolating only the
40% of respondents who indicated that the constitutionality of
warrantless GPS tracking should depend on the nature of the crime
police are investigating) two distinct groups of suspects emerge: those
suspected of relatively severe crimes and those suspected of either minor
crimes or no crime at all. As set forth in the charts that follow, society
appears more willing to permit the warrantless GPS tracking of those
suspected of committing relatively severe crimes vis-à-vis those
suspected of either minor crimes or no crime at all.
GPS Tracking: Those Suspected of Minor Crimes or of No Crime
SUSPECT TYPE
Type (ii): Not suspected
nor accused of a crime
Type (i): Not convicted
nor suspected of a
crime
Type (viii): Suspected
of using illegal drugs
Type (x): Suspected of
illegally growing
marijuana
Type (iii): Convicted
felon not suspected of
any crime

NO WARRANT
REQUIRED
4.6%
(3 of 66)

WARRANT
REQUIRED
95.5%
(63 of 66)

9.0%
(6 of 67)

91.0%
(61 of 67)

35.8%
(24 of 67)

64.2%
(43 of 67)

37.3%
(25 of 67)

62.7%
(42 of 67)

43.3%
(29 of 67)

56.7%
(38 of 67)

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

39

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

246

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

GPS Tracking: Those Suspected of Relatively Severe Crimes
SUSPECT TYPE
Type (v): Suspected
terrorist
Type (vii): Suspected
serial killer
Type (vi): Suspected
drug dealer involved in
a large-scale drugtrafficking conspiracy
Type (iv): Convicted
felon suspected of
committing an
unspecified crime
Type (xi): Suspected of
bank robberies
Type (ix): Suspected car
thief

NO WARRANT
REQUIRED
95.5%
(64 of 67)
91.0%
(61 of 67)

WARRANT
REQUIRED
4.5%
(3 of 67)
9.0%
(6 of 67)

86.6%
(58 of 67)

13.4%
(9 of 67)

82.1%
(59 of 67)

11.9%
(8 of 67)

74.6%
(50 of 67)
56.7%
(38 of 67)

25.4%
(17 of 67)
43.3%
(29 of 67)

Although not reported in detail here, similar results appeared for the
32% of respondents who believed the nature of the particular crime
under investigation should determine whether a warrant is required
before police may obtain a suspect’s cell phone location information
directly from a cell phone provider.
2. Conclusions
Four important conclusions emerge from the collective responses to
this second survey. First, despite the particular method of GPS tracking
employed (i.e., trespassorily attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s
vehicle versus tracking a suspect’s movements by means of a GPSenabled smart phone) there is strong societal support for the overall
outcome in Jones, which effectively limits the ability of police to obtain
GPS tracking information without a warrant. With respect to GPS
tracking in the manner employed in Jones, 51.7% of survey respondents
indicated that police should have to obtain a warrant regardless of the
nature of the crime being investigated, and of the 39.3% of respondents
who would have made the requirement of a warrant dependent upon the
nature of the crime, many of those respondents would have been
unwilling to permit warrantless GPS tracking for the type of suspect at
issue in Jones—the suspected drug dealer.
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Second, society appears unwilling to assume the risk that information
exposed to cell phone providers (such as the location of their phone
during calls) will be shared with law enforcement in the absence of a
warrant. Rather, as a general matter, society deems location information
data presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
whether that data is obtained surreptitiously by the police or directly
from a cell phone provider.
Third, society tends to agree that Fourth Amendment protections
relating to GPS tracking should vary depending on the nature of the
crime being investigated and on the length of surveillance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, society saw no statistically
significant difference in tracking an individual by means of a GPS
tracking device attached to that person’s vehicle and tracking that same
individual by smart-phone enabled GPS. If anything, society believed
that tracking an individual by smart-phone enabled GPS should receive
somewhat greater Fourth Amendment protection than tracking an
individual in the manner employed in Jones. This particular result is
significant in its potential to impact the developing law of cell phone
tracking, which remains much more unsettled than the scenario in Jones.
V. A SLIDING SCALE FRAMEWORK FOR CELL PHONE AND GPS TRACKING
In Jones, the Court did not resolve whether a warrant, probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, or some other standard would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment with respect to the particular method of GPS tracking
employed in Jones.231 The Court has also not set forth any standards to
govern the acquisition of cell site location information, and courts across
the country are imposing different Fourth Amendment requirements in
otherwise similar cases.232 Thus, the question of what would make a
particular instance of GPS or cell phone tracking constitutionally
“reasonable” remains unresolved, and greater clarity is needed.233
Even assuming that the Fourth Amendment would govern all
instances of GPS or cell phone tracking, not every Fourth Amendment
intrusion requires a warrant or probable cause; rather, as the Supreme
Court has declared on a number of occasions, the Fourth Amendment’s
general restriction against “unreasonable searches and seizures” requires

231. United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894, at *4 (E.D. Penn. May 9, 2012).
232. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 137–139 (noting that in many districts prosecutors
may obtain prospective cell site information under a reasonable suspicion standard, whereas some
magistrate judges require probable cause before authorizing law enforcement access to any type of
prospective cell site data).
233. See id. at 121–22 (“determining the proper access standard” for cell phone location
information “is anything but clear under current law”).
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a case-specific analysis as to what is “reasonable.”234 Under this
method of Fourth Amendment analysis, “reasonableness” is determined
under a balancing test, weighing the government’s and individual’s
interests against each other.235 In cases where the government’s interest
is substantial, as in the investigation of the most extreme offenses, and
the individual’s privacy interest is less so, departures from the usual
requirements of a warrant and probable cause may be justified.236
With electronic monitoring of a suspect’s location, the government’s
interest in effective crime prevention is heightened when investigating
the most serious offenses, particularly those that threaten the national
security, such as terrorism investigations. On the other side of the
ledger, the electronic monitoring of a person’s movements becomes
more invasive the longer an individual is tracked.237 Balancing the
competing interests suggests that Fourth Amendment requirements
should vary based upon the suspected crime and length of surveillance,
an approach that is confirmed by my survey results.238
While the notion of varying Fourth Amendment protections based
234. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). See also Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns
upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . ‘reasonableness’ standard.”).
235. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure)
entails’”).
236. Under this approach, police may conduct a wide array of less intrusive searches and seizures
on the basis of “reasonable suspicion,” a lesser standard of cause than “probable cause.” The
“reasonableness” balancing test of Terry v. Ohio has been applied in a number of settings, including:
searches of public school students, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (upholding
search of public school student based on reasonable suspicion); probationers, United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112 (2001) (upholding search of probationer’s home based on reasonable suspicion); and
parolees, Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (individualized suspicion not required for search of
parolee’s home or person).
237. GPS tracking enables the government to track a suspect’s movements twenty-four hours a
day for extended periods of time. Discovering the whole of one’s movements over such a long time is
far more invasive of privacy than discovering one’s movements during a single journey. Under this type
of prolonged surveillance, police can “deduce whether [the suspect] is a weekly church goer, a heavy
drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all
such facts.” The combination of these observations “tell[s] a story not told by any single visit.” United
States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Moreover, it would be incredibly difficult, if
not impossible, to replicate the advantages of GPS tracking on a large-scale basis through more
traditional forms of surveillance. See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 440–44 (2009) (“GPS is
a . . . powerful technology that is easily and cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and
remarkably precise tracking capability . . . . The potential for a similar capture of information or
‘seeing’ by law enforcement would require . . . millions of additional police officers and cameras on
every street lamp.”).
238. See supra notes 221–231 and accompanying text.
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upon the suspected crime and length of surveillance seems empirically
justified, Fourth Amendment case law also reflects a similar approach.
As Skinner, Estrella, and Luna-Santillanes indicate, tracking a suspect’s
vehicle by GPS for only a few days should not require a search warrant.
By contrast, consistent with the opinions of the five concurring Justices
in Jones, tracking the movements of a suspect like Antoine Jones, a
suspected drug dealer, for twenty-eight days or longer should receive
Fourth Amendment protection—presumably the full protection of a
warrant.
Jones involved an investigation of cocaine trafficking involving large
amounts of drugs, one that ultimately led to severe charges against the
suspect and an eventual sentence of life imprisonment.239 Starting with
the type of suspect in Jones, we could begin to fashion a framework for
GPS tracking legislation where tracking any suspect for twenty-eight
days or longer would always require a search warrant. Because Jones
involved a relatively severe offense, this twenty-eight day outer limit
would apply regardless of how severe the crime under investigation. On
the other hand, due to the less invasive nature of a more limited track,
tracking a suspect like Jones for three days or less might not require a
warrant, but may instead require a lesser degree of individualized
suspicion, perhaps reasonable suspicion.240 With such a large time gap
between these two points, the line where warrants would be required
would need to be established.
Consistent with recent, similar proposals, the framework proposed
below would not vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon the
particular method of electronic tracking.241 Rather, under my proposal,
all forms of electronic tracking would be subject to the same
requirements.
This approach not only brings needed consistency to this area, but is
also supported by my survey results. As those results indicate, society
deems location information data presumptively protected by the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of whether that data is obtained surreptitiously
by the police or obtained directly from a cell phone provider. Moreover,
239. See Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259),
2011 WL 5094951.
240. As compared to probable cause, the Supreme Court has declared that the “reasonable
suspicion” standard is “obviously less demanding than that for probable cause,” United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), and requires “considerably less” proof of wrongdoing than proof by a
preponderance of evidence. Id. Under this standard, police may not act on the basis of an
unparticularized suspicion or hunch; rather, an officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable
facts” that, along with reasonable inferences from those facts, justify the intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
241. See Online Communications and Geolocation Protection Act, H.R. 983, 113th Cong. (2013)
(proposing the requirement of a warrant for the government to intercept or force service providers to
disclose geolocation data of any kind).
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as technology continues to evolve, cell site location information is
becoming as accurate, in some instances even more so, than GPS
tracking,242 thus triggering the same privacy concerns as those
highlighted by the concurring Justices in Jones. Given these concerns,
my proposal does not vary Fourth Amendment protections based upon
the particular method of tracking employed.
A. Proposal Details
As noted, there is societal support for varying Fourth Amendment
protections with respect to GPS tracking based upon the nature of the
crime under investigation and length of surveillance. My proposal
incorporates this approach by designating three distinct categories of
individuals and proposing different standards for each.
1. Those Suspected of Severe Crimes
For investigations of relatively severe offenses, my proposal is that
police may track an individual by GPS for up to six days without the
need for prior judicial approval. Under this proposal, police would need
to first establish, and document in advance, reasonable suspicion before
they may track an individual by GPS, whether through surreptitiously
installed GPS devices or through cell phone tracking;243 however, police
would not need prior judicial approval to do so. If, however, a particular
investigation would require lengthier tracking, police would be required
to obtain probable cause and a search warrant to continue that
monitoring. To obtain such authorization, police must further establish
a case-specific need for additional location information extending
beyond six days. Moreover, at this time, police would be required to
demonstrate the factual basis for their initial finding of reasonable
suspicion, which would deter the arbitrary use of this investigative
power and which mirrors what a prosecutor must do to defend against a
motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of a Terry stop.
The category of relatively severe offenses would include
investigations of suspected terrorist activity; large-scale drug trafficking
investigations, the type of investigation where the use of GPS tracking
devices has been most common; and investigations of those felonies
generally recognized by statute as the most extreme, including

242. See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
243. Under this standard, police would need to document in advance their basis for reasonable
suspicion, and be prepared to argue that reasonable suspicion was indeed obtained in advance of such
tracking in the event of a motion to suppress any evidence linked to that investigation.
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homicides, robbery, burglary, arson, and kidnapping.244
This six-day proposal is consistent with my survey results. For
example, in my first GPS tracking survey, for the relatively severe
offenses such as the suspected terrorist, the tipping point, where a
majority of society would require judicial supervision, appears to be 6–
10 days of tracking. This is illustrated by the chart that follows. When
reviewing this chart, each number in the chart represents the percentage
of survey respondents who selected a particular answer choice. For
example, the top left-hand corner of the chart indicates that 89.1% of
survey respondents believed that warrants are always required to track
the movements of an innocent suspect by GPS, whereas the bottom
right-hand corner of the chart indicates that 39.4% of survey
respondents would permit warrantless tracking of the suspected terrorist
to extend for twenty-one days or longer. To make sense of this data, one
must identify the tipping point where a majority of society would
require judicial supervision.

Warrant always
required
Warrantless Tracking
Permitted for
1 day or less
Warrantless Tracking
Permitted for
2–5 days
Warrantless Tracking
Permitted for
6–10 days
Warrantless Tracking
Permitted for
11–20 days
Warrantless Tracking
Permitted for
21 days or longer

Innocent
Suspect

Suspected
Drug-Dealer

Suspected
Terrorist

89.1%

52.9%

32.7%

3.0%

3.6%

4.0%

4.4%

10.3%

8.4%

2.2%

9.0%

7.5%

0.0%

3.6%

7.5%

1.3%

20.6%

39.4%

As this chart illustrates, for the suspected terrorist, 45.1% of society
(32.7% + 4.0% + 8.4%) would not permit GPS tracking to extend
beyond five days without a warrant, and a majority of society, 54.4%,
244. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (designating as sufficient to raise an otherwise
unintentional homicide to murder all killings committed during the course of a “robbery, rape or deviate
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape”).
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would not permit GPS tracking to extend beyond ten days without a
warrant. This data, while not perfectly precise, suggests that judicial
supervision for the investigation of the most serious offenses should
begin somewhere within the 6–10 day range.
In contrast, only 24.2% of survey respondents (3.6% + 20.6%) would
permit warrantless GPS tracking to extend beyond ten days for a suspect
similar to Antoine Jones, as opposed to the 45.1% who were willing to
do so for the suspected terrorist. As set forth more fully below, this data
suggests that less severe offenses should generally remain subject to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
2. Those Suspected of Minor Crimes
For all suspected crimes not falling into the category of severe crimes
identified above, I propose police be required to establish reasonable
suspicion in order to track an individual for up to three days. This
proposal is consistent with the holdings in Knotts, Skinner, Estrella, and
Luna-Santillanes, in the sense that no prior judicial approval would be
necessary to track those suspected of less severe crimes for a relatively
short period of time. Moreover, this proposal is consistent with the
ability to simply track a suspect turn-by-turn without the need for prior
judicial approval. If, however, a particular investigation would require
lengthier tracking, police would then be required to obtain a search
warrant from a judicial officer to continue that monitoring. Under this
proposal, the warrant affidavit must establish the basis for probable
cause and must further establish a case-specific need for additional
location information extending beyond three days. Moreover, at this
time, police would be required to demonstrate the factual basis for their
initial finding of reasonable suspicion, a requirement that would again
help deter the arbitrary use of this investigative power.
3. Those Not Suspected of Any Crime
Finally, consistent with the results of each of my surveys, and
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s restriction against general,
exploratory searches, an individual who is not suspected of committing
any offense could not be tracked by GPS for any period of time,
regardless of the method of tracking.
This particular proposal would account for the concerns of the Jones
Court regarding the possibility of mass surveillance in the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing245 and would be consistent with
245. Indeed, Jones apparently forecloses the possibility of “affixing GPS tracking devices to
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society’s belief, as expressed in my surveys, that police should never be
permitted to obtain data regarding the movements of ordinary, lawabiding citizens in the absence of a particularized showing of
wrongdoing.246
B. Support for this Proposal
Despite its ruling on the constitutionality of GPS tracking under the
particular circumstances at issue in Jones, the Jones Court did not
resolve whether a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or
some other standard would satisfy the Fourth Amendment where a
particular instance of GPS tracking constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search.247 Moreover, the competing interests between law enforcement
needs and privacy concerns triggered by this form of investigation
suggest the need for flexibility in legal standards, a need the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness approach can accommodate. Because the
Fourth Amendment, at its core, simply prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” the Supreme Court has declared that “in principle every
Fourth Amendment case . . . turns upon a ‘reasonableness’
determination, [which in turn] involves a balancing of all relevant
factors.”248 This approach to Fourth Amendment analysis, where the
government’s interests and individual’s interests are pitted against each
other in any given case, suggests the adoption of a “sliding scale of
suspicion”—one that depends on the government’s need for, and the
level of invasiveness of, any particular instance of tracking. In the realm
of electronic tracking, the government’s interest in effective crime
prevention increases when investigating the most serious offenses,
whereas the level of intrusiveness generated by such monitoring
increases the longer an individual is tracked. By adopting a “sliding
scale of suspicion,” one that is calibrated to the particular competing
interests of any given case, my proposal is consistent with this
reasonableness-based approach to the Fourth Amendment.249
On the law enforcement side, this proposal gives police greater
thousands of cars at random,” at least where doing so involves a physical trespass upon the vehicle. See
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing this possibility in the preJones world).
246. See supra notes 221–226 and accompanying text.
247. United States v. Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *4 (E.D. Penn. May 9, 2012).
248. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996).
249. Post-Jones courts appear willing to vary Fourth Amendment protections in a “sliding scale”
manner. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently declared that its “‘sliding scale’ of suspicion,” under
which “[h]ow much cause agents need to do something [would] depend[] on how deeply they invade the
zone of privacy,” “survived Jones, which means that the ‘sliding scale’ approach may allow minimally
invasive intrusion on property interests, not merely privacy interests.” United States v. Peter, No. 3:11CR-132 JD, 2012 WL 1900133, at *15 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2012).
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flexibility in the use of GPS tracking to investigate the most serious
offenses. One senior Department of Justice official recently told a
Senate Committee that “if an amendment [to existing federal statutes]
were to unduly restrict the ability of law enforcement to quickly and
efficiently determine the general location of a terrorist, kidnapper, child
predator, computer hacker, or other dangerous criminal, it would have a
very real and very human cost.”250 Similarly, in a recent GPS tracking
case, United States v. Katzin,251 a federal district court declared that “the
possibly unfettered uses by law enforcement of GPS tracking to gather
evidence to . . . establish probable cause in cases of serious crimes like
drug trafficking, terrorism, and the like, strongly outweigh the concern
about intrusion.”252 I echo these concerns. As the Government argued
in Katzin,
GPS monitoring of a vehicle, at least for a limited period of time on
public roads, is [minimally invasive] in that (1) individuals have a
diminished expectation of privacy when traveling on public
thoroughfares, (2) the intrusion of the installation of a tracking device is
minimal, and (3) the information gathered is less detailed than would be
achieved with visual or aural means of surveillance. [Moreover,] the
GPS tracker cannot even reveal information such as who is in the car,
who is driving the car, or what the occupants do when they arrive at their
ostensible destination—all information that would be revealed . . . by
253
traditional visual surveillance.

Given the arguably reduced privacy concerns inherent in GPS
tracking, the case for warrantless GPS tracking of the most serious
offenses is much stronger.254
Relaxing Fourth Amendment protections in the more extreme cases is
further supported by recent Congressional and judicial decisions. For
example, in 1986, Congress placed statutory restrictions on the use of

250. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 114, at 123 (quoting The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of James A. Baker, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
251. United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894 (E.D. Penn. May 9, 2012).
252. Id. at *5.
253. Id.
254. Unlike the type of GPS tracking at issue in Jones, under which the location of a suspect’s
vehicle may be tracked continually, simply “pinging” a cell phone periodically to determine its location
is far less invasive of privacy than a continual surveillance would be. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[F]or four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every
movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision the
point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4week mark.”) (emphasis added).
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pen registers by law enforcement.255 However, as a result of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress granted special powers
to the Attorney General to authorize use of pen registers without prior
court approval in emergency circumstances relating to international
terrorism and foreign intelligence.256 More recently, the Supreme Court
rejected a challenge to a federal law that broadened the government’s
power to eavesdrop on international phone calls and e-mails, a ruling
which exemplifies the Court’s willingness to permit relaxed standards in
the investigation of the most serious offenses.257 Thus, the notion that
Fourth Amendment protections should vary depending on the nature of
the crime being investigated, particularly in the realm of terrorist
investigations, is consistent with recent federal statutes and Supreme
Court opinions.258
Finally, because my proposal could be easily converted into draft
legislation, my proposal is consistent with Justice Alito’s suggestion in
Jones, which encourages legislative solutions. According to Justice
Alito, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the
best solution . . . may be legislative [because] [a] legislative body is well
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”259 By
incorporating the very “public attitudes” Justice Alito highlights, an
opinion which was endorsed by three additional Justices, my proposal
would likely garner support from a majority of Supreme Court Justices.
Moreover, as a proposed legislative framework, my proposal is
consistent with the recent efforts of various states to enact legislation
that would place definitive restrictions upon law enforcement’s ability to
acquire location information. As of March 2013, at least eleven states
had introduced bills designed to govern law enforcement’s acquisition
of location information, with many of those bills including provisions
designed to restrict the acquisition of cell phone information.260 My
255. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3126 (2012). A pen register is a mechanical device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone; it does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether
calls are actually completed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).
256. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842–1843 (2012).
257. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
258. Such distinctions derive from the Court’s decision in United States v. United States Dist.
Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972), in which the Court explained that the standards
and procedures that law enforcement officials must follow when conducting “surveillance of ‘ordinary
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proposal continues this trend, and goes further by adopting one uniform
set of standards that would likely pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government’s installation
of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle and subsequent use of
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a Fourth
Amendment “search.”261 The precise holding of Jones was limited to
the particular form of GPS monitoring in which police attach a GPS
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle.262 Jones did not determine
the constitutionality of similar forms of tracking accomplished in the
absence of a trespass, such as cell phone tracking; nor did Jones resolve
whether a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or some other
standard would make any particular instance of GPS tracking
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, five Justices in
Jones suggested that a twenty-eight day monitoring period utilizing the
same method of GPS tracking employed in Jones might not trigger the
Fourth Amendment where the investigation involved a more serious
offense than that in Jones, and the remainder of the Court appeared
willing to address such issues in future cases.
In the months following Jones, I administered two surveys designed
to explore possible distinctions in GPS tracking based upon the factors
highlighted in Jones—most notably, the nature of the crime under
investigation and the length of GPS monitoring. The results of these
surveys suggest that society is indeed willing to permit warrantless GPS
tracking for a longer period of time when investigating the most serious
offenses. Reflecting society’s beliefs as to what is “reasonable” in this
method of investigation, I have set forth a proposal that would make the
constitutionality of GPS tracking dependent upon the nature of the crime
under investigation and the length of surveillance, specifically, by
designating three distinct categories of individuals and proposing
different standards for each. With the law of cell phone tracking
unresolved and ever-changing, this proposal provides a consistent
framework for law enforcement and courts to utilize as these issues
arise, one which enjoys both empirical and normative support.

261. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946 (2012).
262. Id. at 948.
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